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FOREWORD 
This document constitutes the final report of the Final ACT Configuration Evaluation, 
which was performed as task 4.2.3.4 of Contract NASl-15325. 
The NASA Technical Monitor for this task was D. B. Middleton of the Energy Efficient 
Transport Project Office at Langley Research Center. 
The work was accomplished within the Preliminary Design Department of the Vice 
President-Engineering organization of the Boeing Commercial Airplane Company. 
Assistance in economic analysis was obtained from the Vice President-Strategic Planning 
organization of the Boeing Commercial Airplane Company. Key contractor personnel who 
contributed were: 
G. W. Hanks Program Manager 
H. A. Shomber IAAC Project Manager 
C. C. Flora Task Manager (Final ACT Evaluation) 
K.A.B. Macdonald Reliability and Cost Analysis 
M. T. McIntosh Structures Technology 
R. B. Snodgrass Economic Analysis 
J. S. Kautzky Economic Anaiysis 
During this study, principal measurements and calculations were made in customary units 
and were converted to Standard International units for this document. 
Use of trade names or names of manufacturers in this report does not constitute an 
official endorsement of such products or manufacturers, either expressed or implied, by 
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. 
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1.0 SUMMARY 
This report presents the results of an evaluation of the reliability, economics, and 
technical risk of the Final ACT Configuration. This configuration is the end product of 
the configuration development tasks of the Integrated Application of Active Controls 
(IAAC) Technology to an Advanced Subsonic Transport Project. The objective of this 
work was to determine the effect on fuel efficiency and economics of designing a 200- 
passenger, medium-range commercial transport airplane to take maximum practical 
advantage of Active Controls Technology (ACT). 
The reference configuration, referred to as the Conventional Baseline Configuration, was 
a modern, state-of-the-art transport airplane. It was balanced for conventional longitu- 
dinal stability margins and had a wing aspect ratio of 8.7. 
The Final ACT Configuration took advantage of ACT to allow balance at a more aft 
center-of-gravity range and with a smaller horizontal tail area and also to minimize the 
wing structural weight penalty resulting from increasing the wing aspect ratio to 12. 
Relative to the Baseline Configuration, the Final ACT Configuration used 10% less block 
fuel at design range, of which 6.5% is attributed to ACT and 3.5% to the increase.in wing 
span. 
An economic evaluation of the Final ACT Configuration was performed using standard 
Boeing 1980 domestic cost methods. The results indicated an incremental return on 
investment of approximately 25% for the Final ACT Configuration at a fuel price of 
$0.26/~ ($l.OO/gal). 
Reliability analyses showed that the ACT functions could be mechanized without 
significant adverse effect on dispatch reliability. The system also met the hardware 
reliability requirement for extremely remote probability of failures that results in loss of 
function; i.e., less than 1 x 10-9 per 1-hr flight for the crucial pitch stabilization function. 
However, the prediction methodology available does not account for the probability of 
software error or other possible generic fault causes. 
The airplane performance benefits identified by the IAAC Project are the result of a 
degree of dependence on control system function that is well beyond that of any currently 
certified commercial airplane. Commitment to commercial application will require 
additional development and testing, both laboratory and flight, to remove technical risks 
identified in this study. These risks are principally in the areas of system tolerance of 
software faults and in control surface effectiveness for large-amplitude and high- 
frequency surface deflections. 
..- -... 
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2.0 INTRODUCTION 
Although active controls have had limited application in several commercial transports, 
those applications typically were made either to overcome an unanticipated difficulty or 
to add capability to the airplane. A considerable body of evidence suggests that the 
greatest benefit from applying ACT to a transport airplane will result from incorporating 
ACT early in the design process. Although this evidence strongly indicates a benefit, it 
lacks verification; there have been no commercial transport airplanes where significant 
applications of ACT were incorporated into the initial design. 
The principal objective of the IAAC Project, therefore, was to assess the benefits 
associated with design of a commercial ACT transport. During development of this 
benefit assessment, certain technical risks became clear. This led to the second objective 
of the IAAC Project, which was to identify technical risk areas and to recommend 
appropriate test and development programs. The final objective-to pursue resolution of 
these risk areas to the maximum possible extent within project resource limitations-is the 
focus of the current IAAC Project work because the potential benefit is significant. 
2.1 IAAC PROJECT 
The IAAC Project comprises three major elements, as discussed in Reference 1 and shown 
in Figure 1. The first, Configuration/ACT System Design and Evaluation, addressed 
design of an ACT transport, to specific design requirements and objectives (DRO), in 
sufficient detail to clearly identify the performance and economic benefits associated 
with the use of ACT. This airplane design incorporated all beneficial ACT systems, with 
current technology implementation assumed, which yielded a performance and economic 
improvement. 
In parallel, work was initiated on the second major element, Advanced Technology ACT 
Control System Definition, to identify potential improvements through use of optimal 
control law synthesis techniques and/or advanced technology components for the 
implementation of ACT systems. 
Further details of the Wing Planform Study results and the Final ACT Configuration 
characteristics are contained in the IAAC Wing Planform Study and Final Configuration 
Selection final report (ref 2). 
Following the benefits assessment, work will begin on the final major element, Test and 
Evaluation, to reduce selected real or perceived technical risks associated with 
implementation of ACT. 
2.2 TECHNICAL APPROACH 
The configuration development activity leading to the definition of the Final ACT 
Configuration has been discussed extensively in References 2 and 3. Details of the major 
configurations developed and a summary of their performance characteristics are given in 
Section 4.0. 
A modern Conventional Baseline Configuration, without any significant application of 
ACT, was developed as a yardstick against which the benefits of ACT could be measured. 
The Conventional Baseline Configuration is illustrated in Figure 2, and its detailed 
characteristics are given in Reference 4. This reference airplane configuration also 
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established the design mission for the ACT configurations. The technology of the ACT 
airplanes designed under this project was fixed at the level established by the baseline, 
except for ACT. 
Airplane configuration design work proceeded under the assumption that any beneficial 
ACT function could be implemented with appropriate reliability and availability. The 
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Figure 1. Relationship of Final ACT Evaluation Task to the bverall IAAC Project 
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Current Technology ACT Control System Definition Task proceeded in parallel to 
determine a suitable low-technical-risk implementation. 
The configuration design has proceeded through the Initial ACT Configuration, the Wing 
Planform Study, and the Final ACT Configuration tasks, as shown in Figure 1. Figure 3 
shows the Initial ACT Configuration; Figure 4 depicts the Final ACT Configuration. As 
shown in the performance summary in Section 4.0, the Final ACT Configuration has 
substantial improvements in fuel economy over the Conventional Baseline Configuration. 
The objectives of the Final ACT Evaluation Task reported herein are to determine what 
the resulting economic benefits to the airline operator would be and to evaluate the 
technical risks in designing the airplane and systems to meet the reliability requirements. 

3.0 SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
This section contains three subsections: Airplane Model Numbers, General Abbreviations, 
and Symbols. Each subsection is arranged in alphabetical order. 
3.1 AIRPLANE MODEL NUMBERS 
768- 102 Conventional Baseline Configuration 
768- 103 Initial ACT Configuration 
768-104 Study configuration, AR 12, A = 31.5 deg 
768-105 Study configuration, AR 10, A = 31.5 deg 
768-106 Study configuration, AR 10, A = 26.5 deg 
768-107 Final ACT Configuration 
3.2 GENERAL ABBREVIATIONS 
ac alternating current 
aPP appendix 
AAL angle-of-attack limiter (limiting) 
ACT Active Controls Technology 
APB auxiliary power breaker 
APU auxiliary power unit 
AR aspect ratio (based on trapezoidal wing planform area) 
ASM available seat-mile 
ASN assigned serial number 
brkr breaker 
BBL body buttock line 
BOS Logan International Airport (Boston) 
BPCU bus power control unit 
BS body station 
BTB bus tie breaker 
BWI Baltimore-Washington International Airport 
7 
BWL 
cg 
cm 
C 
CARE 
CARSRA 
CB 
CPU 
CY 
cL 
dc 
de!z 
DADC 
DOC 
DRO 
EWR 
f 
fig. 
ft 
F 
FAA 
FAR 
FH 
FMC 
FTREE 
gal 
body water line 
center of gravity 
centimeter 
Celsius 
computer-aided reliability estimates 
computer-aided redundant system reliability analysis 
circuit breaker 
central processing unit 
calendar year 
lift coefficient 
direct current 
d 
degree 
digital air data computer 
direct operating cost 
design requirements and objectives 
Newark International Airport (New Jersey) 
function 
figure 
feet 
Fahrenheit 
Federal Aviation Administration 
Federal Aviation Regulation 
flight hour 
flutter-mode control 
fault tree computer program 
gallon 
8 
GCB 
GCU 
GLA 
hr 
in 
IAAC 
IDG 
INS 
I/O 
IRS 
JFK 
kg 
km 
kn 
kVA 
K 
lb 
LAS 
L/D 
LD-(2,3,4) 
LE 
LRU 
LSI 
LVDT 
Q 
m 
generator circuit breaker 
generator control unit 
gust-load alleviation 
hour 
inch 
Integrated Application of Active Controls Technology to an 
Advanced Subsonic Transport Project 
integrated drive generator 
inertial navigation system 
input/output 
inertial reference system 
John F. Kennedy International Airport (New York) 
kilogram 
kilometer 
knot 
kilovoltampere 
thousand 
pound 
lateral/directional-augmented stability 
lift/drag 
lower deck containers (various sizes) 
leading edge 
line replaceable unit 
large-scale integration 
linear variable differential transformer 
liter 
meter 
9 
min 
M 
MAC 
MCDP 
MEL 
MIA 
MIL-HDBK 
MLW 
MTBF 
nmi 
N 
N/A 
Ni-cad 
OEW 
Pwr 
PAS 
PCU 
PHL 
q 
Q 
QPA 
ref 
RADC 
ROI 
ROM 
set 
minute 
million 
mean aerodynamic chord 
maintenance control and display panel 
Minimum Equipment List 
Miami International Airport 
military handbook 
maximum design landing weight 
mean time between failures 
nautical mile 
newton 
not applicable 
nickel-cadmium 
operational empty weight 
power 
pitch-augmented stability 
power control unit 
Philadelphia International Airport 
dynamic pressure 
body axis pitch rate 
quantity per airplane 
reference 
Rome Air Development Center 
return on investment 
read-only memory 
section 
10 
SIC 
SLST 
SOB 
SSFD 
STA 
t/c 
TE 
TOGW 
TP 
TPA 
T-R 
V 
WL 
WLA 
yr 
01 
A 
A 
A 
c 
short circuit 
sea-level static thrust 
side of body 
signal selection and failure detection 
station 
thickness-to-chord ratio 
trailing edge 
takeoff gross weight 
tangent point 
Tampa International Airport 
transformer-rectifier 
voter 
water line 
wing-load alleviation 
year 
3.3 SYMBOLS 
angle of attack 
change in quantity 
failure rate 
sweep 
summation 
11 

4.0 CONFIGURATIONDEVELOPMENTANDPERFORMANCESUMMARY 
4.1 CONFIGURATIONS 
The following subsections briefly describ,e the three configurations developed in greatest 
detail during the IAAC Project. 
4.1.1 CONVENTIONAL BASELINE CONFIGURATION(MODEL 768-102) 
The Conventional Baseline Configuration is a modern, twin-engined, medium-range, 
turbofan-powered transport airplane. It has a passenger capacity of 197 in the standard 
mixed-class interior arrangement and a design range with maximum payload of approxi- 
mately 3700 km (2000 nmi). 
The principal characteristics of this airplane design are shown in Figure 2. Additional 
description, technical data, and analysis results are given in Reference 4. 
4.1.2 INITIAL ACT CONFIGURATION (MODEL 768-103) 
The Initial ACT Configuration was evolved from the Baseline Configuration with the 
constraints that both the wing planform and the airplane size (i.e., the maximum takeoff 
weight) remain unchanged. The resulting airplane uses pitch-augmented stability (PAS) 
and angle-of-attack limiting (AAL) and also incorporates detail changes in the main 
landing gear design to achieve a more aft balance range and reduced horizontal tail size 
with resulting improvements in trim and wetted area drag. Wing trailing-edge surfaces 
were reconfigured for load alleviation and structural mode stabilization, which allowed 
structural weight reductions in the wing. 
The principal characteristics of the Initial ACT Configuration are shown in Figure 3. 
Additional description, technical data, and analysis are contained in Reference 3. 
4.1.3 FINAL ACT CONFIGURATION (MODEL 768-107) 
Recognition of the aerodynamic efficiency improvements possible by increasing the wing 
span and the potential of active control for reducing the structural weight penalties 
usually associated with such increased span led to the Wing Planform Study. Three 
configurations (Models 768-104, -105, and -106) with increased span were investigated. 
This investigation resulted in selection of the Final ACT Configuration with a wing aspect 
ratio of 12 as the most fuel-efficient design within the study constraints. The aspect- 
ratio 12 study configuration (Model 768-104) and the Final ACT Configuration 
(Model 768- 107) are geometrically identical. 
The principal characteristics of the Final ACT Configuration are shown in Figure 4. 
Reference 2 contains details of the Wing Planform Study and selection of the Final ACT 
Configuration. 
4.2 PERFORMANCESUMMARY 
Figures 5 through 10 develop a comparison of the parameters determining fuel efficiency 
for the configurations investigated in the Wing Planform Study. 
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Geometry: Passenger accommodations: Parrenbdrs -Pitch Abreast Weights, kg (lb): 
Body C~OII section. m (in1 First class 15 5 0.965” I35 inl TOGW 122 470 kg (270 055 lb) 
Shape Vertical double lobe Tourist 179 7 0.6Wm I34 in1 OEW 75300kg(l72510lbl 
Maximum width 5.292 il95.001 MLW 112 570 kg 1246 150 lb) 
Maximum height 5.410 (213.001 Came and bwqax. m3 (f&: 
Landing gear 
Tvpe 
Location. m (in1 
Spacing, m (in) 
Tire size. m 
NOSC 
5.71a 
0.257a 
Dual 
31.5a 
3.5a 
5.896 (271.50) 
5.0a 
15.1 
11.609 I241 
10.3 
5.557 (337.30la 
0.939 x 0.330 
2.255 (90.OOla 
5.031 1237.471a 
-0.406 
(37 x 13.16) 
0.351 (151 
9 
255.3 12759P 
0.57 
Main 
4.00 
0.700 
Truck 
0.400 
55.0 
55% MAC 
35.0 
1.143 x 1.422 (45 x 551 
1.092 x 0.393 - 0.506 
143 x 15.5-201 
0.457 (181 
Vertical tail Horizontal tail 
57.4 16151 57.5 (520) 
-- - 
Containers 22 LD-2 or 11 LD-3 Propulsion: Two CF5-5D2 
(in1 
Oleo stroke. m (in1 
Aerodynamic surfacer 
Area, m2 (ft21 
Aspect ratio 
Taper ratio 
Sweep at c/4. deg 
Incid&, SOB. beg 
Dihedral, deg 
Root t/c. percent 
Tip t/c. percent 
Root chord. m Iin) 
Tip chord. m (in1 
MAC, m (in1 
12.0 11.0 
12.0 9.0 
10.565 (426.59) 5.421 (213.451 
7.522 (300.061 2.165 (85.371 
9.351 (355.171 4.027 (155.561 
Span. m (in) 47.244 (1860.001a 5.201 (244.141 15.179 (597.511 
Tail arm. m (in1 19.972 1785.301 27.134 llffi8.301 
Tail arm, coefficientb - 0.088 
Engine toe-in angle-l deg to a EIBL 
Nacelle incidence-Z.526 deg to a BWL 
Wing upper surface at side of body rib at WL 4.940” (194.5 in1 
0.942 
‘Trapezoid geometry quoted: aero reference area = 275.1 m2 12961 ft21 
b6ssed on aero reference area 
Forward 40.76 I14401 25.55 (9451 
Aft 33.98 (12001 22.37 (7901 
Bulk cargo (aft only1 11.33 (4001 11.33 (4001 
Total 86.09 130401 50.55 (21351 
(49 ft 10 in1 
I 
STA 
2.349m 
L -1 8.53bm (25 ft 4 in1 
STA 5.24&n 
(245 in) 
STA 
39.524” 
l3.&i9m 
(44 ft 7 in1 
I 
Figure 2. Con ven tional Baseline Configuration (Model 76B- 102) 
Geometr,,: 
Body cross section, m (in1 
SW Vertical double lobe 
Maximum width 5.029 (198.001 
Maximum haight 5.410 (213.09, 
Landing 9car Nose 
TVP~ Dual 
Location. m linl ES 5.896 (27l.M) 
Spacing. m (in1 0.509 (24, 
Tire size. m (in) 0.939 x 0.330-0.406 
(37 x 13-15) 
Oleo stroke. m (in1 0.381 (151 
Aerodynamic surfaces Wing 
Area, m2 WI21 zz3 127591a 
Aspect ratio a.71a 
Taper ratio 0.257a 
Sweep at c/4. dq 31.5a 
Incidanrr. SOB. deg 3.81 
Dihedral. ckg 5.0’ 
Rwt t/c, percent 15.1 
Tip t/c, permnt 10.3 
Rmtchard, m (in1 83567 o37.301a 
Tip dwrd, m (inI 2.285 @0.01” 
MAC. m (in, 6.031 (237.471a 
Span. m (in1 47.244 Il8EO.0, 
Tail sm. m (inl 
Tail volume 
coafficientb 
Main 
Truck 
54.7% MAC 
1.143 x 1.422 (45 x 551 
1.092 x 0.393-0.508 
(43 x 15.5-20, 
0.508 (20, 
Vertical tail Horizontal tail 
54.0 (5811 32.0 (3441 
0.57 4.00 
0.7w 0.400 
55.0 35.0 
-3.0 
12.0 11 .o 
12.0 9.0 
10.558 (415.74, 4.038 I1 58.98, 
7.392 (291.01) 1.515 (53.59, 
9.070 (357.07, 3.000 (115.10, 
5.014 (235.75, 11.306 1445.13, 
21.579 (853.501 28,533 (1127.28, 
0.090 0.561 
Et-&a tae.in angle = 1 deg to a EEL 
Nacelle incidence = 2.525 deg to a BWL 
Wing upper surfaa at SOB rib at WL 4.940” (194.5 in) 
aTrapezoid 9tometw quoted: aero reference area = 275.1 m2 (2951 ft2, 
batei on YIO reference area 
. 
I 47.240” 1155 ftl * 
Passenger accommodations: Pasrengen -Pitch Abreast Weights, kg llbl: 
First clan 15 5 0.956” (38 in1 TDGW 122 470 (270 0001 
Tourist 179 7 0.864m (34 inl OEW 77370 11706601 
Cargo and baggage. m3 ($1: MLW 111 640 (245 1101 
Containers 22 LD-2 or 11 LD.3 
22.37 (790, 
Propulsion: Two CF5602 
Forward 33.98 112Oul 
Aft 40.78 (1440, 25.85 1948, 
Bulk cargo (aft only, 11.33 (400, 11.33 (400) 
Total 85.09 I30401 60.55 I21381 
TP STA 
STA 
2.349” 
(92.5 in) 
- .- 
I415 in) 
DIN 
5.248” 
(24; in1 TP STA 
30.509 
(1398 in1 
f 
13.452” 
144ft2inl 
11335.8 in1 
45.431m1162 ft4 in) _/ / 
p- 54.178” (177 ft9 in1 pq 
Figure 3. initial ACT Configuration (Model 768-1031 
Geometry: 
Body cross section. m (in) 
Shape Vertical double lobe 
Maximum width m linl 5.023 1198.Ol 
Maximum height, m (in) 5.410 (213.0) 
Landing gear NW? Main 
Type Dual Truck 
Location. m linl ES 6.896 (271 SOI 72.4% MAC 
Spacing, m (in) 0.610 (241 1.143 x 1.422 145 x 56) 
Tire size, m (in) 0.940 x 0.330-0.406 1.092 x 0.394-0.508 
137 x 13.161 (43 x 15.5-201 
Oleo stroke, m (in1 0.381 1151 0.508 (20) 
Aerodynamic surfacer a Vertical tail Horizontal tail 
Area. m2 lft2I 226.8 12441ja s.6 (6091 32.0 13441 
Aspect ratio 12.03a 0.67 4.00 
Taper ratio 0.2678 0.700 0.400 
Sweep at c/4. deg 31.5a 55.0 35.0 
Incidence, SOB, deg 3.8E 
Dihedral. deg 6.0a -3.0 
Root t/c. percenr 15.1 12.0 11.0 
Tip t/c. percem 10.3 12.0 9.0 
Root chord, m lint 6.865 1269.89P 10.811 1425.641 4.038 (156.981 
Tip chord, m linl 1.830 172.061 7.668 (297.941 1.615 163.591 
MACmlinl 4.827 1190.05P 9.285 1365.571 3.000 1118.101 
Span, m linl 52.222 (2056) 6.157 (242.401 11.291 (444.53) 
Tail arm. m (in) 
Tail volume mefficientb 
21.534 1847.781 28.709 I1 130.27) 
- 0.085 0.689 
Engine toe-in angle = 1 deg to a 68L 
Nacelle incidence = 2.625 deg to a BWL 
Wing upper surface at SO8 rib at BWL 4.963m 1195 in) 
aTrapezoid geometry. quoted: aero reference area = 275.8 m2 12969 ft21 
b8awd on aero reference area 
52.222m I171 ft 4 In) 
Passenger accommodations: Paslengen Abreast Pitch P-P 
First class 18 6 0.965m (38 inl 
TOUrilt 179 7 0.854m (34 Id 
Cargo and baggage. m3 If&: 
Containers 22 LD-2 or 11 LD-3 or 11 LD4 
Forward 33.98 (1200) 22.37 (790) 27.61 I 9751 
Aft 40.78 (14401 X.85 (948) 33.13 (11701 
Bulk cargo (aft only) 11.33 I 4001 11.33 14oOI 11.33 I 4001 --- 
TOtal 86.09 (30401 60.55 121381 72.07 125.46) 
Weights. kg (lb): 
TOGW 121 580 (268 040) 
OEW 79890117612U) 
MLW 114 160 (251 6701 
Propulsion: Two CF66D2 
~~-54.178ml177ft9in)~~~ 
Configuration (Model 768- 107) Figure 4. Final ACT 
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Figure 5. Effect of Wing Span on Cruise Lift/Drag 
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Figure 6. Relative Cruise Efficiency 
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Figure 7. Relative Weights 
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Figure 8. Relative Fuel Usage 
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Range 
A + B Maximum payload 
Fuel load increasing 
B + C Maximum takeoff weight 
Fuel load increasing 
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20 - Sea-level range 
- -A Denver range, 33’C (92’F) 
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Figure 10. Payload Versus Range I- Sea- Level and Denver Altitudes, 
Models 768: 102, - 103, and - 107 
Figure 5 shows the trend in aerodynamic efficiency (lift/drag [L/D]) with increasing span, 
with the Final ACT Configuration having approximately 10% increased cruise L/D over 
the Baseline Configuration. Data points are shown for the intermediate configurations of 
the planform study-768105 and 768-106;. The effect of sweep angle on L/D is negligible 
over the range studied. The Initial ACT Configuration, with the same wing planform as 
the Baseline, has nearly 4% improvement in L/D relative to the Baseline. This is due to 
the rebalance and reduced horizontal tail size made possible by ACT, as shown in 
Figure 6. This figure plots cruise L/D as a function of center-of-gravity position for the 
configurations studied. L/D values are normalized to that of the Baseline Configuration 
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at its average cruise center of gravity. Of the 10% improvement shown by the Final ACT 
Configuration, about 4% is due to the rebalance and reduction in tail size and the 
remaining 6% due directly to increased span. 
The adverse effect of span increase is increased structural weight required, principally in 
the wing primary structural box. Figure 7 shows that the Final ACT Configuration 
operational empty weight (OEW) is about 2% greater than the Baseline OEW. The effect 
of wing-load alleviation (WLA) is indicated by the relative positions of the Initial ACT and 
Baseline Configurations on this plot. Figure 7 also shows the large weight penalty for the 
reduced-sweep configuration studied. This weight penalty is due to the wing thickness 
reduction required to maintain the same cruise Mach number. 
Figure 8 shows the net effect of aerodynamics and structural weight changes on fuel 
efficiency. The aerodynamic and weight increments from the Baseline Configuration are 
favorable and result in about a 6% reduction in fuel burn relative to the Baseline 
Configuration. The Final ACT, with its better aerodynamic efficiency offsetting its 
weight increase, shows approximately 10% improvement in fuel efficiency relative to the 
Baseline. 
Fuel burn was compared at the maximum range, where the aerodynamic improvements in 
cruise L/D have greatest effect. At shorter ranges the relative improvements are 
smaller, as shown in Figure 9, which gives block fuel savings, both absolute and in 
percentage, relative to the Baseline Configuration for the Initial and Final ACT 
Configurations. Fuel savings are significant, and the Final ACT Configuration maintains 
its superiority at all ranges. 
Figure 10 shows payload versus range for the Baseline, Initial ACT, and Final ACT 
Configurations; the format of these curves is explained in the inset. For sea-level takeoff 
conditions, the Final ACT Configuration has been resized to achieve the same range with 
maximum payload as the Baseline. The Initial ACT, which was not resized, shows greater 
range at maximum payload. For high-altitude airports, typified by the Denver conditions 
shown, the Baseline and Initial ACT Configurations have reduced maximum takeoff 
weights due to climb performance limitations, which result in reduced range capability. 
The Baseline Configuration does not have range capability from Denver to reach the 
indicated east coast destinations with maximum payload. The Final ACT Configuration, 
due to its increased span, has no climb performance limitations at Denver conditions and 
thus maintains full payload-range capability. 
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5.0 RELIABILITY EVALUATION 
The reliability evaluation presented here is limited to the ACT system. As described 
elsewhere, the Baseline and Final ACT Configurations have similar system configurations, 
with the exception of ACT. 
The Final ACT control system is described fully in Reference 2 and shown schematically 
in Figure 11. Four central frame-synchronized digital computers control all ACT 
functions, which are: 
l The quadruply redundant essential PAS function, which stabilizes the short-period 
pitch mode by driving three secondary actuators that position the main elevator power 
control unit servovalves, based on a simple fixed-gain control law. The only sensor 
input required is pitch rate, which is obtained from the three inertial reference units 
and from a single, dedicated pitch-rate sensor. Level 3 handling qualities are ‘thus 
provided. The equivalent of quadruple actuation redundancy is obtained by modeling 
the secondary actuator in each computer so that after two failures a single actuator 
and model will provide control. 
l The triply redundant full PAS function, which stabilizes both the short-period and the 
phugoid instability by adding triply redundant airspeed signals to the essential PAS to 
provide level 1 handling. 
l The triply redundant WLA function, which uses vertical acceleration at the airplane 
center of gravity to reduce maneuver-caused wing bending moments by deflecting the 
outer ailerons upward. To prevent this aileron movement from destabilizing the short- 
period and phugoid pitching modes, WLA cross feeds to the PAS secondary actuators. 
0 The AAL function, which uses a dual-redundant stick pusher to overcome normal pilot 
elevator control force and thus prevents the airplane from entering deep stall. It uses 
triple angle-of-attack signals modified by pitch rate to provide protection in abrupt 
stall entry maneuvers. 
The four central computers communicate with one another over dedicated data buses, 
which facilitates selection of the best sensor and actuator command and enables faulty 
components to be temporarily or permanently switched out. Such faults are recorded at 
the component level for future ground maintenance. Actuator outputs are force series 
summed with the pilot or autopilot control signals. 
5.1 FAILURE CRITICALITY 
The safety impact of failure of any ACT function depends on its necessity for continued 
safe flight or its function criticality level, defined as follows: 
l Flight Crucial-Complete loss of function results in an immediate, unconditional 
hazard to safe and continued flight. 
l Flight Critical-Complete loss of function results in a potential hazard to safe, 
continued flight, but appropriate flight crew action can avert the hazard. 
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l Non-Flight Critical-Complete loss of function may result in increased crew workload 
or passenger discomfort but does not result in a hazard to safe, continued flight. 
l Dispatch Critical-Function is required for dispatch. 
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Figure 11. Final ACT System Architecture 
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5.2 IMPACT OF ACT FUNCTION LOSS ON FLIGHT SCHEDULE AND DISPATCH 
Failures of the ACT system may delay or cancel airplane dispatch, or restrict flight, or 
necessitate diversion to another airport, depending upon the nature of the system failure. 
The assumed airplane performance capability when ACT functions are partially or 
completely inoperative is described as follows: 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Essential PAS Loss-The airplane will be lost if essential PAS is lost in the air. If the 
function is lost on the ground, the airplane cannot be dispatched until the system is 
repaired. The pilot will divert to the nearest suitable airport when the system is one 
failure away from loss of essential PAS. 
Full PAS Loss-The airplane must be operated within a restricted flight envelope when 
the static stability augmentation of full PAS is lost. If the function is inoperative on 
the ground, the airplane can be dispatched into a restricted flight envelope. 
LAS (Yaw Damper) Loss-The airplane must be operated within a restricted flight 
envelope when lateral/directional-augmented stability (LAS) is lost in the ai’r. If the 
function is totally inoperative on the ground, the airplane cannot be dispatched 
because LAS is required for limiting structural loads; however, the airplane can be 
dispatched into a restricted flight envelope with one channel of the LAS inoperative. 
AAL Loss-The airplane can continue a normal flight schedule after AAL is lost in the 
air, because such loss does not degrade airplane handling qualities within the 
operational flight envelope. However, the pilot will be informed of system status and 
will continue the flight with special caution. If AAL is inoperative on the ground, the 
airplane cannot be dispatched because of loss of safety margin. Inadvertent operation 
of the stick pusher could be catastrophic under some flight conditions and therefore 
must be as equally remote in probability as failure of a crucial function. 
Concurrent Loss of WLA, Yaw Damper, and Full PAS-Because the concurrent loss of __- 
WLA, yaw &mKand full PAS impactshandling qualities and at the same time 
reduces structural margins, the flight crew will divert to the nearest airfield when the 
system is one failure away from this condition. 
5.3 RELIABILITY REQUIREMENTS 
Reliability requirements for the Final ACT Configuration are based on Figure 1 of 
Reference 5, reproduced herein as Figure 12. Full compliance with all the “consequence 
of failure conditions” will finally depend on a detailed assessment of handling 
characteristics after function failures, which is not possible at this stage of design. To 
establish reasonable reliability requirements, the effects of failures described in 
Subsection 5.2 have been used in conjunction with Figure 12 to establish the failure 
probability requirements shown in Table 1. 
5.4 ASSUMPTIONS OF RELIABILITY ANALYSIS 
l Software reliability is assumed equal to 1.0. 
l All equipment is assumed serviceable prior to each flight. 
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l A minimum of two operating channels is required for success. 
l Coverage (probability of successful transfer) from quadruple to triple and from triple 
to dual is assumed equal to 1.0. 
5.5 FLIGHT SCHEDULE RELIABILITY PREDICTION 
Using the fault trees described in Appendix C and the failure rates listed in Appendix B, in 
conjunction with the fault tree (FTREE) computer program (appendix A), enabled 
prediction of the function failure rates shown in Table 2. 
Comparison of the first and last column in the table shows that the Final ACT 
Configuration, including flap position indication as backup to the digital air data computer 
(DADC), meets all reliability requirements. 
t 
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Figure 12. Relationship Between the Consequence of Failure and the 
Probability of Occurrence 
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Table 1. Failure Probability Requirements and Criticality 
of ACT Functions 
Probability of Flight crew action 
Failure Criticality failure during required on loss 
I-hr flight of function 
Essential PAS Crucial <1x10-9 None, 
aircraft is lost 
Full PAS Critical <l x10-5 Reduce speed 
AAL 
Failure to operate Critical <1x10-5 Proceed with added 
care 
Inadvertent operation Crucial < 1 x 10-9 Disconnect and over 
ride stick pusher 
WLA Critical <1x10-5 None 
One failure away from concurrent loss Critical <l x10-5 Divert to nearest 
of full PAS, yaw damper, and WLA airfield 
The ACT airplane must meet dispatch requirements as follows: 
a. Airplane schedule reliability must be at least 98.7%. Not more than 5% of the unreliability 
shall be attributableto ACT system failure. 
b. The airplane shall be dispatchable with any one ACT system component failed. 
Table 2. Predicted or Required Probability of Failure Events ( I-hr Fligh tl 
Event 
Essential PAS failure 
Full PAS failure 
WLA failure 
AAL failure 
(Yaw damper failure)a 
Any of the above 
Probability of retreat to restricted envelope 
(full PAS one failure away) 
Probability of diversion due to being one 
failure away from loss of essential PAS 
Probability of diversion from one failure 
away from loss of the set 
(full PAS x WLA x yaw damper)b 
Probability of diversion from all causes 
Probability of inadvertent AAL actuation 
Flap position gain schedule backup T 
With 
9.0 x lo-'* 
1.1 x 10-7 
1.7 x 10-7 
2.3 x 1O-7 
3.0 x 10-7 
6.9 x 10-7 
5.70 x 10-4 
1.44 x 1o-7 
3.18 x 1O-7 
4.30 x 10-7 
4.00 x 10-10 
WithoutC 
9.0 x 10-12 
1.1 x 10-7 
2.1 x 10-7 
2.3 x 1 O-7 
3.0 x 10-7 
6.9 x 1O-7 
5.70 x 10-4 
1.44 x 1o-7 
1.27 x lo4 
1.28 x lo+ 
4.00 x 10-10 
With 
but without 
partitioning 
3.49 x 10-10 
1.67 x 10-7 
1.21 x 10-5 
4.26 x 1O-7 
1.63 x lO-6 
(LAS) 
NA 
7.08 x lo4 
1.327 x 1 O-6 
7.1 x 10-4 
7.1 x 10-4 
Require- 
ment (see 
table 1) 
1 x 10-9 
1 x 10-5 
1 x 10-5 
1 x 10-5 
NA 
NA 
10-3 
1 x 10-6 
1 x 10-6 
1 x 10-5 
1 x 10-9 
‘The yaw damper is part of the Baseline Airplane, hence its failures are not chargeable to the ACT program, 
but, for comparison with other systems, the probabilities including that system are provided. 
bDiversion is the result of being one failure away from loss of crucial PAS (very low probability) or one 
failure away from loss of the set (full PAS x WLA x yaw damper). Although the yaw damper is part of 
the Baseline Airplane, it must be included in this calculation. 
‘Based on closest equivalent current technology Integrated System (ref 6). 
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Comparison of column 1 with column 3 (table 2) shows the benefit derived from 
partitioning the active control computer, the DADC, and the inertial reference system 
(IRS). Crucial PAS failure goes from 3.49 x lo-10 to 9 x lo-12 and smaller, but significant 
improvements are apparent in other functions. The need for such partitioning was shown 
by the FTREE run of an earlier system configuration (see table 3) of component ranking 
for impact on a top failure event probability. This showed that loss of full PAS, LAS, and 
WLA in the current technology Integrated System, reported in Reference 6, would cause a 
diversion. The “unreliability” column is the assumed failure rate of the component, the 
“delta probability” is the impact of the component on the top event, and the “top 
probability” shows what the failure probability of the top event would be if the component 
reliability were set equal to 1.0. 
The preceding predictions are based on the assumptions of Subsection 5.4. These 
assumptions are known to be optimistic in the design of crucial digital flight hardware 
because both software failure (error) and coverage failure have finite nonzero probability 
of occurrence. More sophisticated reliability models such as the computer-aided 
reliability estimation (CARE III) model being developed by Raytheon have better 
capability to properly model digital computers driving highly complex, critical flight 
control systems. The Boeing fault tree model (ref 6, app B, subset B.2.0) can list and 
predict the independent probability of each minterm. It appears that this information can 
be used in a reliability model such as CARE III to account for latent failures and 
degrading coverage. However, no results of such advanced reliability studies are available 
at this time. 
Table 3. Component Sensitivity to Full Pitch-Augmented Stability, Lateral/Directional- 
Augmented Stability, and Wing-Load Alleviation Loss Causing Diversion in 
Current Technology Integrated System 
IAAC sensitivities of multiple occurring events to top event 377 
Component names Event Unreliability Delta probability Top probability Rank 
Computer B 28 1.510 x 10-4 7.12 x lO-8 9.579 x 10-8 1 
Computer A 27 1.510 x 10-4 7.12 IO -8 x 9.579 x 10-8 2 
Computer D 30 1.510 x 10-4 7.12 10 
-8 
x 9.579 x 10-8 3 
Sensor, air data C (DADC) 50 8.500 x lO-5 4.01 -8 x 10 1.269 x lO-7 4 
Sensor, air data B (DADC) 49 8.500 x lO-5 4.01 x lo*-8 1.269 x lO-7 5 
Sensor, air data A (DADC) 48 8.500 x lO-5 4.01 
-8 
x IO’ 1.269 x lO-7 6 
Computer C 29 1.510 x 10-4 4.00 x 10\-12 1.670 x lO-7 7 
Power hydraulic A (landing gear) 31 8.700 x lO-5 2.00 x IO-l2 ‘1.670 x lO-7 8 
Elevator, actuator B 21 3.860 x lO-5 1.00x IO-l2 1.670x lO-7 9 
Elevator, actuator A 20 3.860 x lO-5 1.00 -I2 x 10 1.670 x lO-7 10 
32 1.400 x 1 o-5 3.00 10 -I3 Power, hydraulic B x 1.670 x lO-7 11 
Note: See Reference 6 for further data on current technology Integrated System. 
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The reinitialization capability designed into the current system will provide the answer to 
many of the transient hardware and software problems of present digital computers. 
Approximately 90% of computer failures are not traceable to hardware defects (ref 7), 
and the impact of such interruptions on ACT operability may be alleviated by rapid, 
automatic recovery from temporary faults. 
5.6 DISPATCH RELIABILITY 
Prediction of dispatch reliability (the probability that the airplane may be dispatched 
without delay in excess of 15 min) can be made by either of two methods: 
l By an analysis based on the probability of a required ACT function being made 
inoperable by failure of a component 
l By comparing delay rates experienced in commercial service, resulting from the 
failure of components, that are similar to the ACT components both in function and 
dispatch requirements 
Although the FTREE program can compute the probability, as in Table 2, that an airplane 
would be in an undispatchable condition upon landing, the program cannot assess the 
impact of the time required to troubleshoot, repair, or replace, nor does it account for the 
different maintenance time available at a through-stop, a turnaround, or an overnight. 
All of these data and much more are required to determine whether there will be a 
dispatch delay, but such data are not readily available. 
The second method requires extensive actual airline experience data on the number and 
duration of delays charged to particular components similar to ACT hardware in both 
function and Minimum Equipment List (MEL) requirements. The MEL identifies those 
components that can be inoperable without precluding dispatch. Previous experience has 
shown that only the second method provides accurate predictions, and it is therefore used 
here. 
A simplifying assumption used in the calculations was that if any component is part of a 
redundant set, not all of which is needed for dispatch, it does not contribute significantly 
to dispatch delays or cancellations. This assumption is valid because the probability of 
two failures is much lower than that of a single failure. 
These calculations cover only the increment in dispatch delays and cancellations produced 
by incorporating the ACT system into the Baseline Airplane. 
Table 4 shows the ACT component to be analyzed and then lists hardware currently in 
airline service chosen to approximate the ACT component, the airplane type in which it is 
used, and the actual delay and cancellation rates experienced. The following correction 
factors are used as indicated in the table: 
l Number Per Airplane-The ratio of the number of components in the ACT airplane to 
the number of similar components in the airplane in service. 
l -Flight Length Factor-The ratio of 1 hr, assumed as the ACT airplane duration, to the -- -___ 
average flight duration of the inservice airplane. 
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Table 4. Dispatch Reliability Prediction 
I-- A B C D E F 
Number and 
name of part 
added to (or Cornpar- ~s~~~$~~i~“” 
Number 
deleted from) Ison 
per 
airplane numbers and part airplane Baseline names factor 
Configuration 
rhree elevator 
secondary 
actuators 
I I 
747 27-31-675-051 
elevator PCU 314 
Two elevator 
Mwer control 27-31-675-051 
mits (PCU) 747 elevator PCU 
-214 
(reduction) 
. 
Angle-of-attack 
imiting system 
27-32-xxx (shaker) 
3243-xxx (pneumatics) 2/l 
Selected wmoonents 
4CT additional 27-21-280-191 
rydraulic lines 727 rudder hydraulic 2/l 
hoses 
Inertial refer- 
snce system 
(IRS) 
34-49-692-021 
747 
INS navigational unit 
313 
minus navigational 
computer 
n -dicated 
Kllog, plNm- ,-I_-\ -Y&-L I 
34-49-692-021 
747 
INS navigational unit 
rat- ------ 
minus navigational II3 
e sensur 
I computer 
Four ACT 34-12-130-011 
computers DC-10 digital air data 412 
computer 
Digital air data 34-12-130-001 
computer DC-IO digital air data 
(DADC) computer 
312 0.58 
‘F 
!; 
light- R 
rngth ra 
nctor fz 
0.36 0.91 0.0277 0.095 0.0 0.0068 0.023 
0.36 
1 .o 
0.91 0.0277 0.095 0.0 (0.0045) (0.016) 
1.0 0.0149 0.0069 0.0021 0.030 0.014 ) 
1 .o 
0.36 
0.36 
0.58 
0.007 0.4115 0.3212 0.0 0.00035 0.00027 
1.1 0.116 0.097 0.0 0.148 0.124 
1 .o 0.116 0.097 0.0 0.101 0.084 
Cancel, 
lations 
D.0 
0.0 
0.0042 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
*When DADC is backed up with flap position, 
it is possible to dispatch with one DADC Not including DADC 
inoperative. (i.e., assuming flapposition 
backup for DADC) 
Including DADC 
(i.e., assuming no flapposition 
backup for DADC) 
I LRU totals 1 0.369 IO.31 1 IO.0042 1 
Remarks 
No MEL dispatch 
with a secondary -1 actuator inoperative 
No MEL dispatch 
without all PCUs 
No MEL dispatch 
without all parts 
Increased likelihood 
of hydraulic leaks 
No MEL dispatch 
without IRS 
No MEL dispatch 
without dedicated 
pitch-rate sensor 
No MEL disoatcb 
No MEL dispatch* 
without all DADCs 
0 Removal Rate Factor-The ratio of anticipated removal rate of an ACT component to 
the experienced removal rate of an inservice component. This value may be estimated 
by the-ratio of failure rates. 
It is noteworthy that the airlines do not count a delay if the airplane is dispatched under 
flight restriction unless the dispatch is delayed beyond 15 min. The sum of the 
interruption rates for each of the listed components represents the line replaceable unit 
(LRU) total; i.e., the total interruptions traceable to the particular ACT LRUs. 
Experience has shown that total airplane interruptions for an automatic flight control 
system are about 1.3 times as great as the sum of all interruptions traceable to particular 
LRUs because of interface problems. Therefore, the ACT system totals are computed as 
1.3 times the LRU totals. 
Table 5 lists the components that contribute most to dispatch delays under various MEL 
assumptions. The bottom two lines show why flap position sensing was provided to back 
up DADC q (dynamic pressure for gain scheduling) in the Final ACT Configuration. The 
delay rate allowed under the DRO for the Baseline Airplane was 1.3%. The ACT system is 
not to add more than 5% to that. Thus, the allowable limit is 0.65 delay per thousand 
departures (5% of 1.3% of 1000). The Final ACT System meets this objective. The Final 
ACT System does not, however, meet the objective that the airplane be dispatchable with 
any one ACT component inoperative. The loss of one ACT computer precludes dispatch 
because it degrades the essential PAS function below the 1 x 10-V requirement. 
Table 5. Significant Contributors to Dispatch Delays 
Component Delays per 1000 FH* Minimum equipment list requirement! 
~-- 
IRS (without computer) 0.084 Dispatch not permitted with IRS 
failed 
Four ACT computers 0.148 All four computers required for 
dispatch 
Digital air data computers 0.101 All three DADCs required for 
dis’patch 
Other LRUs 0.036 
LRU total 0.369 Including DADC delays 
when there is no flap 
position backup 
LRU total 0.268 ACT does not require DADC for 
dispatch, because flap position 
backs up DADC for gain scheduling 
*Final ACT meets dispatch requirements of < 0.65 delay per 1000 FH. 
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6.0 ECONOMIC EVALUATION 
The economic evaluation consists of two subsections: Subsection 6.1, a detailed estimate 
of maintenance-related cost increments, and Subsection 6.2, an evaluation of the impact 
of Initial ACT (768-103) and Final ACT (768-107) Configurations on airline economics 
relative to the Baseline Configuration (768-102). 
6.1 ESTIMATION OF FIRST COST AND MAINTENANCE COST INCREMENTS 
Estimates of first cost and maintenance cost increments, attributable to Final ACT 
Configuration changes from the Baseline Configuration, are tabulated in Table 6 (1980 
dollars). Initial ACT is included for comparison. 
6.1-l INCREMENTAL AIRPLANE COST 
It was desired to explore the difference in airplane cost between the Initial ACT and the 
Final ACT Configurations because both incorporated the Integrated System, and the 
primary difference, both in performance (fuel burn) and configuration, was the change 
from an aspect ratio (AR) 8.71 wing to an AR 12.03 wing. Aspect ratios quoted are based 
on reference trapezoidal planform area. The cost increment of the Initial ACT 
Configuration relative to the Baseline Configuration was detailed in Reference 3 and is 
summarized in Table 6. The cost increment between the Initial ACT and Final ACT 
Configurations reflected the weight changes shown in Table 7. 
Wing planform and surface changes between the Initial and Final ACT Configurations are 
seen by comparing Figures 13 and 14. The following description gives details, which were 
also used to estimate the cost increment: 
l Flutter-mode control (FMC) is not used; therefore, the outboard aileron is no longer 
split, and the two FMC actuators and their associated wiring and hydraulic connections 
(two hydraulic systems per actuator) are deleted. 
l An outboard single-slot, trailing-edge flap is added to the outboard wing, and the 
outboard flap torque tube is extended to drive it through two rotary actuators. 
Table 6. Incremental Price and Maintenance Cost (1980 Dollars) 
Parameter incremented (relative to 
Baseline Configuration, 768-102) 
T 
Purchase cost per airplane 
Maintenance manual cost per 30-airplane fleet 
Test equipment cost per 30-airplane fleet 
Spare inventory initial cost per 30-airplane fleet 
Maintenance cost per airplane flight hour 
Departure delay and cancellation cost per 
airplane flight hour 
1980 dollars 
Initial ACT 
300 000 
Final ACT 
600 000 
24 800 24 800 
26 600 26 600 
295 500 295 500 
5.48 5.31 
1.03 0.41 
1 
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Table 7. Weight Changes Between Initial ACT and Final ACT 
Wing aspect ratio increased from 8.71 to 12.03 
(trapezoidal) and area decreased from 256.3 m2 
(2759 ft2) to 226.8 m2 (2441 ft2) 
Vertical tail area increased from 54.0 m2 (581 ft2) 
to 56.6 m2 (609 ft2) 
+2384 (+5255) 
+I 27 (+280) 
Body weight increased because of increased tail loads 
Main landing gear weight increased because of increased 
gear loads 
+I 50 (+330) 
+41 (+90) 
Nose landing gear weight increased because of increased 
gear loads 
+14 (+30) 
Outboard reserve tank deleted 
Fuel system weight decrease 
Wing structure weight decrease 
Unusable fuel weight decrease 
FMC system deleted 
Split outboard aileron eliminated; wing structure weight 
decrease 
-45 (-100) 
-14 (-30) 
-45 (-100) 
-43 (-95) 
-45 (-100) 
Total weight increment 
Operational empty weight: 
+2522 (+5560) 
79 887 kg (176 120 lb) 77 365 kg (170 560 lb) 
768-107 Final ACT 768-103 Initial ACT 
Weight A 768-107 from 
768103, kg (lb) 
l One outboard leading-edge slat is added to the outboard wing on each side. Two rotary 
actuators per side are added to drive each added slat, and the outer slat torque tube on 
each side is extended to drive these geared rotary hinges. 
l Twelve wing accelerometers and associated wiring are deleted from the wing tips. 
The ACT functions implemented in the Final ACT Configuration were PAS, WLA using the 
outboard aileron, and AAL. 
First Cost and Maintenance Cost of Final ACT Computers-It was postulated initially that 
because the Final ACT was somewhat simpler than the Initial ACT in that FMC and gust- 
load alleviation (CLA) were not used, some reduction in first cost and maintenance cost 
and some improvements in reliability might be obtainable from computer simplification. 
This postulate is examined below. 
The Final ACT control system is the Integrated System with certain modifications due to 
deletion of certain functions. The FMC and GLA functions have been deleted, leading to 
the following modifications: 
l FMC accelerometers deleted 
l GLA accelerometers deleted 
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Leading-edge slats 
Outboard aileron 
Outboard flap, single slot 
utboard spoilers (three panels) 
Center spoilers (two panels) 
Inboard aileron 
Inboard spoilers (two panels) 
Inboard flap, single slot 
Control column 
Horizontal stabilizer 
Figure 13. Flight Control Surfaces-Final ACT (76%. 107) 
\ Leading-edge slats 
Lower rudder 7 /&I 
Outboard aileron (outboard portion) 
Outboard aileron (inboard portion) 
Outboard flaps, single slot 
Outboard spoilers (five panels) 
Inboard aileron 
Inboard spoilers (two panels) 
Control column 
Inboard flaps, single slot 
Horizontal stabilizer---/ 
Elevator J 
Figure 74. Flight Control Surfaces-Initial ACT (768.703) 
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l Inboard flaperons and servos deleted 
l Outboard flaperons and servos deleted 
l Split outboard aileron replaced with a single surface, and outboard aileron inner- 
segment servos deleted 
These modifications allow some simplification of the Integrated System computers, 
primarily in the input/output (I/O) and servodrive sections, and’ reduction of memory 
required. Table 8 shows I/O and servodrive requirements for the Integrated System and 
Final ACT System. As can be seen from the table, the number of analog inputs and 
outputs is reduced by approximately 50%, with servoelectronics reduced by 60%. The 
number of discrete outputs is reduced by approximately 40%, and the number of discrete 
voters (servo shutdown logic and AAL voters) is reduced by 55%. Based upon circuits used 
in the General Electric MCP-701A, this leads to elimination of approximately one 23- by 
18-cm (V- by 7-in) card for the I/O and servoelectronics. An additional card may be saved 
by deleting the six servo shutdown logic voters, if these are constructed from discrete 
parts. If a custom large-scale integration (LSI) chip is used for the voters, these could be 
put on a single board for the Integrated System computer, rather than the two required 
for discrete part construction. The requirement for separation of the servo logic from the 
rest of the computer would prevent the elimination of any boards, but parts cost would be 
reduced 55% for the LSI version. 
Table 9 lists the estimated memory for the Integrated System and Final ACT System. The 
table shows a reduced requirement for the Final ACT System: 25K compared to 32K for 
the Integrated System. This reduction in memory would have some impact on reliability 
but very little on cost; both computers would undoubtedly be provided with space for at 
least 32K of read-only memory (ROM), and parts savings would be small for memory, 
particularly if large, modern ROMs were used. 
Differences between the computers for the Integrated System and Final ACT System are 
relatively minor except for a significant reduction in discrete voter logic. If off-the-shelf 
computers, modified for ACT, are used, it is likely that the same computer would be 
offered for both systems. The Final ACT System computer would have slightly better 
reliability due to fewer parts required, but this difference would be small. 
It was therefore concluded that no change in Initial ACT computer cost, maintenance 
cost, or reliability was justified at this time. 
6.1.2 MAINTENANCEMANUALCOSTFOR30-AIRPLANEFLEET 
Maintenance manual cost was based on typical autopilot cost prorated for increasing 
electronic complexity. Because of the reasoning expressed earlier (First Cost and 
Maintenance Cost of Final ACT Computers), the same cost was assumed for both Initial 
and Final ACT. 
6.1.3 INCREMENTAL TEST EQUIPMENT COST FOR 30-AIRPLANE FLEET 
Incremental test equipment cost assumed that the airline would already possess the basic 
digital test equipment for the remainder of the digital electronic suite. Thus, the cost 
increment was based on the cost of additional adapters and test software required for 
ACT, and because of the reasons given earlier the same cost was assumed for both Initial 
and Final ACT. 
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Table 8. lnpu t/Ou tpu t and Servodrive Requirements for Integrated and Final A CT Sys terns 
I/O or servodrive Integrated System Final ACT System 
Discrete inputs Air/ground.logic 2 Air/ground logic 
Test initiate 3 Test initiate : 
Electric power monitor 
3” 
Electric power monitor 4 
Hydraulic pressure monitor Hydraulic pressure monitor 3 
Pneumatic pressure 2 Pneumatic pressure 2 
Solenoid (AAL) valve position 4 Solenoid (AAL) valve position 4 
Dump valve position 2 Dump valve position 2 
Slat position 3 Slat position 3 
Actuator fail (P-H) 4 
Total 77 Total 23 
Analog inputs Dedicated pitch rate 1 Dedicated pitch rate 1 
Column force 1 Column force 1 
Dynamic pressure 1 Dynamic pressure 1 
Cg acceleration 1 Cg acceleration 1 
Stabilizer position 1 Stabilizer position 1 
Flap position 1 Flap position 1 
Servo position 10 Servo position 4 
Servo spool position 4 Servo spool position 4 
Servo current 2 
FMC acceleration 2 
G LA acceleration 2 
Total 26 Total ci 
Digital inputs IRS 1 IRS 1 
DADC 1 DADC Maintenance/display Maintenance/display : 
Cross channel 3 Cross channel 3 
Total 6 Total 6 
Discrete outputs Warning displays 12 Warning displays 8 
Self-test 6 Self-test 6 
Stick-pusher activate 1 Stick-pusher activate 1 
Stabilizer drive 2 Stabilizer drive 2 
Shutdown actuator-servo failure 40 Shutdown actuator-servo 16 
Shutdown actuator-computer 24 Shutdown actuator-computer 16. 
failure failure 
Total 85 Total 49 
Analog outputs Elevator position command 1 Elevator position command 1 
Rudder position command 1 Rudder position command 1 
Outpoard aileron outer segment 1 Outboard aileron outer segment 1 
position command position command 
Outboard aileron inner segment 1 
position command 
Outboard flaperon position command 1 
Inboard flaperon position command 1 
Total 6 Total 3 
Digital outputs Cross channel 1 Cross channel 1 
MCDP 1 MCDP 1 
Caution/warning 1 Caution/Warning 1 
Total 3 Total -7 
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Table 8. Input/Output and Servodrive Requirements for integrated and Final ACT Systems (Concluded) 
I/O or servodrive I Integrated System I-- ~~ Final ACT System 
Discrete voter logic 
Servo shutdown 
logic 
AA L voter 
Servodrives 
Elevator 
Rudder 
Outboard aileron outer segment, 
left 
Outboard aileron outer segment, 
right 
Outboard aileron inner segment, 
left 
Outboard aileron inner segment, 
right 
Outboard flaperon, left 
Outboard flaperon, right 
Inboard flaperon, left 
Inboard flaperon, right 
AA L voter 
Total 
Elevator 
Rudder 
Outboard aileron outer segment, 
left 
Outboard aileron outer segment, 
right 
Outboard aileron inner segment, 
left 
Outboard aileron inner segment 
right 
Outboard flaperon, left 
Outboard flaperon, right 
Inboard flaperon, left 
Inboard flaperon, right 
Total 
1 Outboard aileron, right 
1 
1 
1 
ii 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
10 
Elevator 
Rudder 
Outboard aileron, left 
AA L voter 
Total 
Elevator 
Rudder 
Outboard aileron, left 
Outboard aileron, right 
1 
5 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Total 
6.1.4 INCREMENTAL SPARES INVENTORY INITIAL PURCHASE COST FOR 
30-AIRPLANE FLEET 
Incremental spares inventory initial purchase cost was affected primarily by the higher 
cost, higher-removal-rate electronic equipment; therefore, the same cost was assumed for 
Initial and Final ACT. 
6.1.5 MAINTENANCE COST PER FLIGHT HOUR 
Maintenance cost per flight hour was calculated based on past experience and recent 
predictions at the significant LRU level, as shown in Table 10. Compared to Initial ACT, 
reductions were due to deletion of the wing-mounted accelerometers and elimination of 
the FMC actuators. An increase was caused by the addition of the one leading-edge and 
one trailing-edge device on each wing, for a net decrease as shown in Table 6. The 
additional maintenance cost for ACT is less than that for a current autopilot system 
because the rate gyros that account for up to 70% of the maintenance cost of. current 
systems are eliminated. Vertical reference and rate data are provided by the IRSs, which 
are part of the baseline aircraft navigation system. 
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Table 9. Memory Estimates for Integrated and Final ACT Systems 
Software module 
Integrated System, Final ACT System, 
words words 
Real-time control 
Real-time executive 900 900 
Foreground tasks 
Synchronization 600 600 
Multirate scheduler 200 150 
SSFD 1 000 800 
Control laws 1 200 900 
Output mqnitor 400 200 
Servomonitor 400 160 
Background tasks 
Flight crew interface 6 000 4 500 
In-flight tests 200 200 
Maintenance support 2 000 1 500 
Ground operations 
Test executive 1 200 1 200 
Preflight tests 
Computer self-test 4 000 4 000 
System monitor test 800 800 
End-to-end tests 1 000 600 
Maintenance test 1 000 450 
Total 20 900 16 960 
Minimum with 50% growth allowance 31 350 25 440 
6.1.6 INCREMENTAL DELAY ANQ CANCELLATION COST PER FLIGHT HOUR 
The decrease shown in Table 6 is due to the addition of flap position backup to the DADC 
for gain scheduling, which enables dispatch with the DADC down (see table 4). 
6.2 ECONOMICS 
An economic assessment of the Final ACT Configuration (768-107) was performed to 
provide direct operating cost (DOC) and return on investment (ROI) data on the 
configuration relative to the Baseline Configuration (768-102) and the Initial ACT 
Configuration (768- 103). Return on investment is given in the following results as 
incremental ROI, defined as the return on the incremental investment for the ACT 
configurations, calculated by the formula shown in Table 13. 
6.2.1 METHODS AND DATA 
The methodology and assumptions used in the analysis are summarized in Tables 11 
through 13. Each airplane configuration was analyzed at two ranges, 926 and 1852 km 
(500 and 1000 nmi), using two fuel prices: $0.26/!2 ($l.OO/gal) and $0.36/Q ($1.35/gal). The 
current 1980 domestic price of fuel is $0.26/!2 ($l.OO/gal); $0.36/Q ($1.35/gal) represents a 
39 
Table 10. Prediction of Maintenance Cost per 1000 Flight Hours -Final ACT 
D a Nomenclature Reference 
QPA ASN D 
EDmuLarks =- 
Dedicated pitch-rate sensor 1 N/A 2.64 5.28 Based on workshop experience 
High-lift devices 
I 4 I and 747 57 ATA 27 I 348.14 696.29 I 747 LE and TE transmission and 
flap mechanisms 
Computer I4 I N/A 1 940.88 1 1881.76 1 Significant component estimate I I -I I I 
Preflight and maintenance 
test oanel 
, 
N/A 137.63 275.26 Significant component estimate 
Secondary actuator 
Stick pusher pneumatic 
actuator 
_I - 
9 27-21-675-021 608.06 727 rudder actuator used as baselir 
2 78-34-008-001 10.03 Based on 727 thrust reverser actua’ 
Stick pusher solenoid valve 
Based on 727 hydraulic reservoir 
~~:~~ / iGl:i:,:I pneumatic brake 
Stick pusher relief valve 2 N/A 0 0 Simple pneumatic relief valve- 
no maintenance cost 
Stick pusher pressure gage 
I I 
2 32-43-284-031 
I 
1.44 
I 
3.12 
Based on 727 pneumatic brake 
pressure indicator -___ - 
Stick pusher pressure switch 2 21-33-522-041 0 0 -t 
Based on 727 pressure warning 
system 
Stick pusher dump valve 2 32-43-576-211 12.10 27% 
Based on 727 pneumatic brake 
control valve 
Ni-cad battery 1 N/A 170.99 
Estimate prorated to 0.6649 - 
removal rate --.- _ 
Battery charger 
T-R unit 
1 24-32-l 04-011 6.89 15.98 Based on 727 
2 24-32-l 04-011 1.66 3.37 Based on 727 
Static inverter 
Transformer 
4 24-22-294-011 28.00 58.34 Factor of 10 applied to 747 inverts 
for continuous duty . .- 
4 - 0 0 
Delete four elevator control -4 27-31-675-051 -172.40 
1344.80 
Based on United Airlines 747 
units 1977 data - 
Add additional hydraulic 
lines and hoses I I 
- 27-31-312-101 10.90 29.16 Based on 727 elevator multiplied 
by 3 
D a Quantity per airplane 
Boeing identifier 
Dollars per 1000 FH 
Total of $3515.33 for 768-107 
Factor total by 1.28” = $4499.62 per 1000 FH (1978 $1 
768-107 ACT System total = $4499.62 x 1.182 = 
$5318.55 (1980 $) 
*Accounts for maintenance costs not covered by LRU reporting. 
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predicted 1987 price in constant 1980 dollars. Detailed DOC, incremental ROI, and 
incremental payback results are presented in Tables 14 and 15 for each configuration. 
The following discussion will focus on the results at 926 km (500 nmi) (see table 14). The 
results at 1852 km (1000 nmi) would be more favorable for the Initial and Final ACT 
Configurations because of the greater proportion of the flight spent in cruise, where fuel 
burn reduction is larger. 
The major economic benefit derived from the Final ACT Configuration is fuel savings, 
approximately $217 OOO/airplane/yr at $0.26/Q ($l.OO/gal). Fuel consumption decreases 
approximately 5%, from 32.2 kg (71.0 lb) per seat for the Baseline Airplane to 30.7 kg 
(67.6 lb) per seat for the Final ACT Airplane (table 16). This savings works out to an 
incremental ROI of 25.1%. 
Table 11. Direct Operating Cost Elements 
Crew cost 
Fuel 
Airframe maintenance 
Engine maintenance 
Burden 
Depreciation 
Insurance 
Z (of above elements) 
Utilization 
= f (TOGW, cruise speed, mission type) 
= Fuel burn and fuelprice specified 
= Specified (Boeing) 
= Specified (engine manufacturer) 
= f (maintenance labor) 
= f (useful life, residual value, utilization, 
initial price, spares price) 
= f (initial flyaway price) 
= DOC per trip 
= f (block time) 
Table 72. Return-on-Investment Analysis Ground Rules 
.- 
Constant 1980 dollars 
15 years’ useful life 
46% tax rate 
Sum of years’digits depreciation schedule: 10 years to 10% residual value 
10% investment tax credit taken over 3 years 
926- and 1852-km (500- and 1000~nmi) range, domestic rules 
2200-trips/yr utilization at 926 km (500 nmi) 
1400~trips/yr utilization at 1852 km (1000 nmi) 
Fuel price: $0.26/Q ($1 .OO/gal) basic, $0.36/Q 
@1.35/gal) alternative (1987 fuel price in 1980 dollars) 
A yield*: +8% for $0.36/Q ($1.35/gal) 
65% oassenoer load factor 
*A yield is incremental revenue per passenger mile. 
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Table 13. Incremental Return-on-Investment Method 
‘ 
useful life 
Net present value (NPV) = -I + 
c 
(clN-cOUT)/(l + rjn 
n=l 
I When NPV = 0, r = incremental ROI = discount rate 
Incremental cash outflows 
Airplane price (I) 
Insurance (CDDT) 
Incremental cash inflows (annual) 
Cash operating cost savings (CfN): 
Fuel 
Maintenance 
Adjustments for depreciation tax effects and investment tax credit are included 
Table 14. Active Controls Economic Summary-926 km (500 nmi), Domestic Rules (7980 Dollars) 
Airplane configuration 
Fuel price, $/II ($/gal) 
DOC, $M/y r 
Fuel 
Crew 
Insurance 
Engine labor 
Engine material 
Airframe labor 
Airframe material 
Burden 
Depreciation 
Incremental after-tax ROI, 
percent 
Incremental payback period, year 
Baseline 
(768-l 02) 
0.26 0.36 
(1.00) (1.35) 
9.97 11.56 
4.56 6.15 
1.57 .1.57 
0.16 0.16 
0.11 0.11 
0.40 0.40 
0.2 1 0.21 
0.19 0.19 
0.65 0.65 
2.12 2.12 
- 
Initial ACT Final ACT 
(768-103) (768-l 07) 
0.26 0.36 0.26 0.36 
(1 .OO) (1.35) ~.. (1 .OO) (1.35) 
9.84 11.39 9.78 11.30 
4.40 5.95 4.34 5.86 
1.57 1.57 1.57 1.57 
0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 
0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 
0.39 0.39 0.38 0.38 
0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 
0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 
0.66 0.66 0.65 0.65 
2.14 2.14 2.16 2.16 
31 .o 41.4 
pm; 
25.1 
I 
32.8 
~~ 
2.08 1.51 2.60 1.95 
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Table 75. Active Controls Economic Summary- 1852 km (lOOOnmi), Domestic Rules 17980 Dollarsl 
Airplane configuration 
Baseline Initial ACT Final ACT 
(768-102) (768-103) (768-107) 
Fuel price, $/Q ($/gal) 0.26 0.36 0.26 0.36 0.26 0.36 
(1 .OO) (1.35) (1.00) (i .35) (1 .OO) (1.35) 
DOC, $M/yr 10.56 12.30 10.36 12.02 10.24 11.85 
Fuel 4.95 6.69 4.72 6.38 4.61’ 6.22 
Crew 1.87 1.87 1.87 1.87 1.87 1.87 
Insurance 0.16 0.1s 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 
Engine labor 0.11 0.11 0.1 1 0.11 0.10 0.10 
Engine material 0.38 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.36 
Airframe labor 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 
Airframe material 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 
Burden 0.61 0.61 0.62 0.62 0.61 0.61 
Depreciation 2.12 2.12 2.14 2.14 2.16 2.16 
I I 
Incremental after-tax ROI, - - 45.5 60.6 37.8 49.3 
percent 
Incremental payback period, 1.37 1 .oo 1.68 1.25 
year 
Table 16. Airplane Economic Summary- 1980 Domestic Rules and $0.26/Q ($l.OO/gal) Fuel 
Maximum 
Airplane Engines TOGW, 
kg (lb) 
Baseline 
(768-102) 
Initial ACT 
(768-103) 
Final ACT 
(768-107) 
CF6-6D2 
CF6-6D2 
CF6-6D2 
122 470 
(270 000) 
122 470 
(270 000) 
121 581 
(268 040) 
Number 
of seats 
197 
197 
197 
Still-air 
range, 
km (nmi) 
925-km (500-nmi) long-range cruise 
3589 
(1938) 
4065 
(2195) 
3589 
(1938) 
32.2 
(71 .O) 
31.1 
(68.6) 
30.7 
(67.6) 
7.885 
7.782 
7.728 
- 
31.0 
25.1 
*Statute mile. 
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Another factor that affects the rate of return of the ACT configurations is the 
incremental price for each airplane. Figure 15 presents the sensitivity of incremental 
ROI to changes in incremental price for both the Initial ACT Configuration and Final ACT 
Configuration. A price increase of $100 000 for the Final ACT Airplane would result in a 
3.5% decrease in incremental ROI to approximately 21.6%. Likewise, a $100 000 decrease 
in price from the study price of $600 000 would translate into a 4.7% increase in 
incremental ROI. 
In addition to obtaining the data presented in Tables 14 and 15, an analysis was conducted 
to determine the potential revenue benefit of the greater payload and range capability of 
the Final AC? Configuration over the Baseline Configuration at high-altitude airports. 
Denver was chosen as the example for this analysis. Itineraries were identified that 
potentially would require offloading out of Denver for the Baseline Airplane. The 
probability of offload situations was determined, and the expected revenue loss due to 
offloading was calculated. The expected revenue loss is $8000/airplane/yr for the 
Baseline Airplane in a 30-airplane fleet. Airlines are believed to place a higher value on 
the cost of offloads, and this is estimated to be $20 OOO/airplane/yr for this example. The 
cost of offloads appears low because very few of the flights of a 30-airplane fleet are 
involved. As shown in Figure 10, the Final ACT Airplane has full range capability out of 
Denver. This then is a potential revenue gain for the Final ACT Airplane, which would 
have no offload situations out of Denver. This revenue gain for the Final ACT Airplane 
would change the results in Tables 14 and 15 very little. 
80 - 
60 - 
Conditions: 
l 1980 domestic rules 
. 926-km (500~nmi) trip 
l Fuel: $0.26/Q ($l.OO/gal) 
0’ I I I I I 
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 .o 
A price, dollars in millions 
Figure 15. Effect of Price on Incremental Return on Investment 
6.2.2 EVALUATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Evaluation of Initial ACT (768-103)-The addition of active controls to the Baseline 
Airplane, relocation of the wing, and reduction in horizontal tail size increased maximum 
range 13% for the same gross weight and reduced fuel burned by 3% for a 926-km (500- 
nmi) trip. Because the airplane study price increased less than 1% from the Baseline and 
direct operating costs decreased l%, incremental ROI was approximately 31%. This 
option is clearly profitable. 
Evaluation of Final ACT (768-107)-Sizing the airplane for the baseline range with active 
controls and a high-aspect-ratio wing provided a 5% savings in block fuel for a 926-km 
(500-nmi) trip, a 2% reduction in DOC, and approximately a 25% incremental ROI at the 
study price increase of less than 2% above the Baseline Airplane. This option provided the 
least fuel burned and lowest DOC. The superiority of the high-aspect-ratio wing is more 
evident at ranges above 1100 km (600 nmi). 
Conclusions-As shown in Table 16, both the Tnitial ACT and Final ACT Configurations 
appear to be acceptable investments for an airline. The Initial ACT Configuration gives 
an excellent incremental return on the relatively modest additional investment of 
$300 000 per airplane. The investment of a further $300 000 per airplane for the Final 
ACT produces a slightly smaller incremental ROI but should be attractive because of 
better high-altitude-field performance, less fuel burned, and lower DOC. 
One potential operational consideration is the effect of the increased span of the Final 
ACT Configuration on airport gate availability. An informal study of one major terminal 
indicated that about 7% fewer gates would be available to the 768-107 than the 768-102 
or 768-103. The economic consequences of this have not been quantified. 
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7.0 TECHNICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 
7.1 RISK CATEGORIZATION 
A technical risk assessment of the Final ACT Configuration has been made. Risks have 
been categorized as either (1) risks that existing design and analysis methods deal with 
inadequately or (2) concerns that can be handled by existing methodology but that require 
technical effort beyond that expended thus far in the IAAC Project. 
These technical risks and concerns are to be understood as those existing now, relative to 
the ability to proceed with the design, development, certification, and introduction into 
commercial service of a new transport airplane incorporating ACT as a basic component 
of its design. 
7.2 RISK IDENTIFICATION 
Risk assessments for the technology areas of significant importance to the conclusions of 
the IAAC Project are described in the following subsections. Where a category 1 risk is 
identified, required development activity or design alternatives are described briefly. 
Category 1 risks and recommended development activities are discussed in Subsection 7.3 
and summarized in Table 17. 
7.2.1 AERODYNAMICS 
No category 1 technical risks are identified. 
In category 2, the high aspect ratio and taper ratio of the Final ACT Configuration wing 
require higher outboard wing section lift coefficients, relative to the Baseline 
Configuration, to maintain cruise lift coefficient and span load distribution. This may 
Technical risk item 
Table 17. Recommended Development Activities 
Development activity required 
Improved unsteady aerodynamic 
methods for control surfaces 
WLA control surface aerodynamic 
effectiveness 
l Large deflections 
l Unsteady aerodynamics 
Continue development of computa- 
tional fluid dynamics for unsteady 
flows, with viscous effects 
Improved data base for control 
surface effectiveness and hinge 
moments on modern airfoil sections 
and at high Mach number and Rey- 
nolds number 
Develop experimental data base on 
generalized trailing-edge surfaces 
for correlation with improved com- 
putational methods 
Crucial systems 
Inability to prove system reliability 
considering- 
System architectures tolerant of 
common mode failures 
0 Software error 
l Dissimilar redundancy 
l Monitoring 
l Hardware and software 
l lnline and cross channel 
Develop several competing archi- 
tectures (in addition to IAAC plan- 
ned work) to laboratory demonstra- 
tion of flight-qualified hardware 
and software; flight demonstration 
of at least one Selected System 
(preferably more than one) 
. Latent and pattern failures 
. Other common mode failures 
- 
Software verification and validation 
methods development 
Recommendations 
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result in reduced buffet margin and increased pitchup tendency. In addition, the reduced 
chord length available for outboard leading-edge flaps may make satisfactory low-speed 
stall characteristics more difficult to achieve. It should be noted that active control 
pitch stabilization allows the configuration to tolerate more pitchup than a conventional 
configuration. 
A detailed wing development, using analytical and wind tunnel methods, is required to 
resolve these issues. This is a normal development activity for a new airplane 
configuration. 
7.2.2 STRUCTURES 
Category 1 risks identified are: 
l Aerodynamic control surface effectiveness for WLA 
l WLA system response including saturation effects 
Effectiveness of the WLA system is critically dependent on the aerodynamic effectiveness 
of the wing control surfaces. IAAC studies and the 747 WLA demonstrator flight program 
have shown that to maximize the benefits of active control systems, the limits of control 
authority (actuator rate limits and control surface deflection limits) will be fully 
exploited. Thus, during flight test of a new design, little margin will be available to 
recover from an overly optimistic prediction. Simple changes to sensor location or 
control law parameters cannot offset a basic deficiency in aerodynamic authority or 
actuator rate. 
Surface effectiveness at large deflections, for the Mach number and angle-of-attack 
ranges critical for wing loads, is affected by separated flow regions and thus is sensitive 
to Reynolds number and is not well predicted by available theoretical methods. High 
Reynolds number wind tunnel pressure and force data supported by theoretical analysis 
and correlation with flight data are required to provide adequate information for low- 
frequency applications, such as maneuver-load alleviation or low-frequency GLA. 
Flutter suppression and GLA system requirements tend to be sensitive to configuration 
variables and to be most complex for large, low-load-factor airplanes such as large 
transports. Uncertainties in the prediction of incremental airloads due to complex 
structural vibrations and control surface oscillations are the principal concerns. 
For this reason, scaled dynamic wind tunnel models have been used extensively in the past 
to verify flutter margins in the design of large aircraft without ACT. However, subscale 
modeling of active controls systems adds considerable complication to dynamic models. 
Accordingly, such models can be used mainly to .substantiate analysis methods and to 
measure aeroelastic transfer functions. It is necessary to continue the development of 
computational fluid dynamics for unsteady flow, with viscous effects included, in order to 
increase confidence in analytical methods to the level required for design decisions 
involving flight-critical ACT applications. Full-scale flight demonstration of analytical 
prediction capability is also required to attain that level of confidence. 
Active control for load reduction and airframe stabilization is affected by nonlinearities 
due to high angle of attack, and the WLA control surface response and resulting load 
relief are affected by control surface actuation hinge-moment and rate limits. This 
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implies (1) knowledge of high angle-of-attack characteristics and surface hinge moments 
to an accuracy not usually attainable in wind tunnel testing or (2) conservative system 
designs to avoid saturation effects, which could significantly reduce WLA effectiveness or 
result in overshoot or divergence in maneuvering at minimum airframe stability 
conditions. A development effort is needed to improve computational methods for control 
surfaces, both for steady and nonsteady aerodynamics including viscosity effects, and 
extensive correlation with experimental data is required. 
Category 2 technical concerns are as follows: 
The increased wing span and reduced outboard structural box depth increase wing weight 
and reduce outboard stiffness. This results in reduced effectiveness of the outboard 
aileron as a WLA surface and more critical outboard wing flutter and dynamic gust 
response. Detailed aeroelastic analysis is required to establish design trades between 
wing structural material requirements and control surface size. There may be a payoff 
for additional load relief surfaces (flaperons), but a detailed trade study and data from 
high-speed wind tunnel tests would be required for verification. 
7.2.3 FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEMS 
Category 1 technical risks identified are: 
0 
0 
0 
Software Reliability-For the essential PAS function, the Final ACT System uses --~ 
quadruply redundant hardware, but the hardware design and software are common to 
all channels. To meet reliability requirements, the probability of an error in the 
software, which results in loss of the crucial function, must be less than 10-9. Current 
validation and verification methods do not provide assurance of such low error 
probability. 
Latent Failure-Reliability analyses were performed assuming no undetected faults at 
takeoff. However, current built-in test provides only about 95% coverage. Reference 
8 also shows that only about 50% of gate level faults are detected by cross-channel 
monitoring. The presence of latent (undetected) failure seriously affects the 
reliability assumptions made, particularly with regard to exposure time and probability 
of simultaneous failures. 
Pattern Failures-LSI circuits are particularly susceptible to manufacturing errors, .----__ 
which may be repeated from chip to chip and which when not detected can lead to 
failures when the circuits are presented with certain patterns of data or instructions. 
This could cause a simultaneous failure of redundant hardware, with potentially 
catastrophic results. Methods of testing for, predicting, and preventing these types of 
failures are not well developed at this time. 
Thus a single set of digital computers of any level of hardware channel redundancy, using 
common hardware and software, does not appear to be capable of meeting reliability 
goals, particularly those for a crucial function. Potential solutions to this dilemma are: 
l Use dissimilar hardware and software for each channel of the multichannel redundant 
system; i.e., what might be termed “massive dissimilarity.” 
l Use dissimilarity with switching; i.e., switch between the normal system and a 
dissimilar backup system upon detection of anomalous behavior of the normal system. 
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l Use dissimilarity with limited-authority normal system; i.e., the dissimilar backup 
system functions all the time and has full authority. Normal system inputs are 
superimposed on the backup system through a hardware limiter. Common mode faults 
in the normal system are limited to acceptable values by the hardware limiters. 
l Eliminate crucial system requirements by imposing a minimum unaugmented airframe 
stability criterion. 
The feasibility of the massive dissimilarity approach has not been established. It appears 
that it would impose significant development cost, equipment purchase cost, and logistic 
penalties, because software maintenance and update cost is a major element in life cycle 
cost. 
Dissimilarity with switching raises a number of problems that are unresolved at the 
present time. The switching algorithms, redundancy level of switching hardware, 
protection against latent failures in the switching device, and methods for ensuring that 
the switching mechanisms are free of common mode failures need to be established. 
Dissimilarity with the limited-authority normal system eliminates the need for the 
switching monitor. It may, however, impose a performance penalty because, by 
definition, normal system outputs are of limited amplitude such that any common mode 
failure in the normal system is hardware limited to safe values. 
The backup systems in the previous two systems could be either analog or digital. 
However, a digital backup system again raises the problem of common mode fault due to 
software. This might be avoided by dissimilar software and digital hardware in each 
channel of the backup system. Since the backup system is comparatively simple, 
hardware and software dissimilarity would pose far fewer problems in the backup system 
than in the massive dissimilarity approach. 
Common mode failures in digital systems can be caused by software design coding errors 
and software specification errors. Hence, the dissimilarity must also be applied to 
software specification and design to eliminate the risk of common mode failures. 
Imposing minimum unaugmented airframe stability requirements will eliminate the need 
for a crucial system. Nevertheless, some type of augmentation system is needed. Unless 
the authority of this system can be reduced to a level where a hardover failure can be 
tolerated, the requirement to eliminate the common mode failure risk remains. 
A well-defined and well-executed laboratory test plan is necessary to verify that all 
system elements work as expected and to demonstrate failure survivability for any failure 
not shown to be extremely improbable. Failure conditions not demonstrated to be 
survivable will require an intensive, rigorous examination to justify classification as 
extremely improbable. 
Current and projected future work under the IAAC Project contract is directed toward 
resolving these control system risk areas. A control system architecture will be defined 
that is tolerant of common mode failures. System design and component procurement for 
laboratory testing will be pursued. Current architecture studies tend toward either the 
dissimilarity with switching or the dissimilarity with limited-authority normal, system 
approaches previously discussed. 
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Additional development is required to establish the most cost-effective system that meets 
the requirements for reliability and dispatchability. It is probably necessary to have 
several competing systems developed to at least laboratory demonstration level. In 
particular, projected reductions in hardware costs and potential improvements in software 
design and verification methodology may make the “massive dissimilarity” approach more 
feasible. 
In addition to the category 1 risk areas, category 2 concerns were expressed about the 
following aspects of the system: 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Cross-Channel Data Transfer-Failure of the cross-channel data buses could lead to 
shutdown?%f?l%%gital system. These buses must be designed with careful attention 
to such factors as electromagnetic interference and lightning to prevent simultaneous 
loss of all cross-channel data. 
Crew Communication-The problem of what information to present to the crew and the 
manner in which this information is to be transmitted and displayed require further 
detailed consideration. 
Dissimilar Pitch-Rate Sensors-The system defined for the Final ACT Airplane uses 
four pitch-rate signals: three from the IRSs plus one from an additional pitch-rate 
sensor. This may lead to problems in comparison of data due to differing dynamic 
characteristics of the sensors and potentially reduced reliability due to nuisance trips 
of the fault detector. Four identical pitch-rate sensors dedicated to the backup 
system will be investigated and may be the preferred configuration. 
Dissimilar Redundancy-The system mixes dual, triple, and quadruple redundancy, 
which leads to complex redundancy management and complex software. Careful 
attention to initializing and indexing is necessary to be certain that all computers 
function properly in any channel. 
7.3 RECOMMENDED DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES 
The following subsections describe development activities recommended to alleviate the 
category 1 risks identified in the structures and flight controls areas. 
7.3.1 STRUCTURES 
The recommended activities are as follows: 
l A specific flight test program on a subsonic transport airplane with advanced airfoil 
sections to measure aerodynamic characteristics of outboard control surfaces, 
including hinge moments, section aerodynamic properties, and oscillatory aerodynamic 
characteristics, in the Mach number and deflection ranges of interest for WLA. Wing 
internal loads and external surface pressures should be instrumented. 
l These flight test results be correlated with analytical predictions based on doublet 
lattice and kernel function unsteady aerodynamic methods. 
l The preceding results be correlated at zero frequency with wind tunnel pressure data 
on a model of the flight-tested aerodynamic configuration. 
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The foregoing activities probably can be accomplished most efficiently by contracting 
with the airplane manufacturer for the flight test, including data reduction, and for the 
wind tunnel model construction., Wind tunnel testing should be planned for a Government 
facility with the largest Reynolds number capability in the Mach number range of 
interest. The analytical work could be done either inhouse by NASA or contracted. A 
combination of NASA inhouse and contracted work would likely achieve the most efficient 
information exchange. 
A rough estimate of timing and cost for this work is as follows: 
l Flight test (including data analysis): 
1 year $1.5 to $2.0 million 
l Wind tunnel test: 
9 months $500 000 to $750 000, assuming contracted model construction and facility 
costs 
l Analytical work: 
1 year $250 000 to $400 000 
The wind tunnel test might be eliminated, or the model design and construction costs 
reduced, if an adequate wind tunnel pressure model and test data exist for the flight test 
configuration. 
7.3.2 FLIGHT CONTROLS 
The planned work to completion of the IAAC Project will develop-one system architecture 
through the beginning of laboratory evaluation. This work should be continued to 
complete system laboratory evaluation and flight test evaluation. 
In addition, further research on competing architectures is required. At least one 
alternate architecture should be developed through laboratory evaluation. Supporting 
research in software verification, validation, configuration control, and monitoring 
schemes is also required. 
A rough estimate of timing and cost for this work is as follows: 
l Complete laboratory and flight evaluation of the IAAC system: 
2 years $6 to $10 million 
l Alternate architecture development and laboratory evaluation: 
3 years $3 to $4 million 
l Supporting research: 
3 years $750 000 to $1 million 
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8.0 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The configuration design and evaluation activities of the IAAC Project have resulted in 
definition of the Final ACT Configuration. This airplane configuration achieves a fuel 
savings of 10% at its design range. At a fuel cost of $0.26/!2 ($l.OO/gal), the airplane 
yields an incremental ROI to the operator of 25% relative to the Conventional Baseline 
Configuration at 925-km (500-nmi) range. Analysis shows that the ACT functions required 
for these performance and economic improvements can be provided with satisfactory 
dispatch and flight reliability. In achieving this performance the technical risks are 
chiefly in the areas of aerodynamic effectiveness of the WLA control surfaces and 
software reliability. The system described and analyzed has multiple redundant hardware 
but has common software in all channels. Evidence and opinion available at present 
indicate that flight-crucial functions (whose failure probability must be demonstrated to 
be extremely remote; i.e., less than 1 x 10-9 per I-hr flight) require hardware and 
software dissimilar redundancy. Further control system development under the IAAC 
Project will be directed toward defining a system that is tolerant of software error and 
other common mode failures in performing flight-crucial functions. 
It is recommended that further NASA research be directed toward development of 
systems for flight-crucial functions that can demonstrate tolerance of common mode 
failures. Research is also required to develop an adequate data base for WLA control 
surface design. 
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APPENDIX A: RELIABILITY ANALYSIS METHODS 
COMPUTER-AIDED REDUNDANT SYSTEM RELIABILITY ANALYSIS 
Initial reliability predictions concerning the system adopted for Final ACT, in which all 
active control functions are performed by four central computers operating in parallel and 
communicating with one another via digital data buses resident in the computers, were 
performed using the Boeing-developed computer-aided redundant system reliability 
analysis (CARSRA) computer program (ref A-l). This analysis, as shown in Tables A-l and 
A-2, indicated that a four-channel system would meet the crucial reliability requirement, 
but a triple-channel system would not (ref A-2). 
Subsequently, a detailed reanalysis was made using a fault tree approach because of the 
following limitations of the CARSRA method: 
0 
a 
0 
0 
0 
Equal reliability of similar modules in each channel is ‘a poor assumption because 
power bus and hydraulic supply reliabilities vary. 
There is a very limited capability to handle unequal sensor reliability. 
CARSRA does not portray system logic as clearly as the FTREE computer program. 
CARSRA does not rank LRUs by contribution to total system failure probability. 
CARSRA does not print out minterms and their probabilities for use in establishing 
built-in test requirements. 
FAULT TREE 
Reliability predictions for the Final ACT Configuration were made using the Boeing- 
developed FTREE computer model, which has the following capabilities: 
& Direct access via local interactive terminal with capability to accept: 
0 1000 events 
0 1000 gates 
0 100 multiple occurring events 
0 Output printout 
l Failure probability at each gate 
l Identification of minterms and the failure probability of each 
@ Impact of specified events on the top event or system failure probability 
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Table A- 1. Quadruple-Channel System Configuration Comparison of Failure Probability 
VI 
co 
Case Description of case Configuration 1 Configuration 2 Configuration 3 
Sensor Computer Actuator Sensor Computer Actuator Sensor Computer Actuator 
4 IRS Q sensors, A = 263 
A 
4 computers, h = 250 
4 mechanical, actuators 1.87 x 10-l’ 5.92 x 10-10 5.47 x lo-‘0 
h (includes hydraulics) = 56.6 
Like A, except 3 mechanical 
B actuators a’nd a mathematical 
model, A = 0 
i .48 x to-lo 5.53 x lo-‘0 5.42 x 10-l’ 
Like B, except 3 IRS- 
3.51 x 10-10 
C based Q sensors, 9.52 x 10-l’ Selected 3.4 x 10-10 
h = 263, and 1 dedicated 
Cl sensor, h = 73 
configuration 
D 
Like C, except all Q 
from dedicated sensors 
7.56 x 10-l’ 8.13 x 10-l’ 7.12 x 10-l’ 
Like D, except a 
different computer, 
A= 167 
2.49 x 10-l’ 2.75 x 10..’ ’ 2.4 x lo-” 
Notes: 1. Figures indicate essential PAS probability 
of failure rate per l-hr flight. 
2. V is voter. 
3. X = failure rate of component per lo6 flight hours. 
Table A-2. Three-Channel Configuration Comparison of Failure Probability 
At least 2 
At least 2 
At least 2 
Sensor Computer Secondary 
actuator 
Configuration 5 
Sensor Computer Secondary 
actuator 
Configuration 6 
T 3 actuators + 1 mathematical model 
Case A: 
3 IRS 0 sensors 
3 computers 
3 hardware actuators 
1 mathematical model 
3.95 x lG-7 
7.89 x 10’ 7 
Case B: 
3 dedicated Q sensors 
3 computers 
3 hardware actuators 
1 mathematical model 
1.88 x 1O-7 3.98 x 10 -7 
1.99 x 10-7 
2 actuators + 1 mathematical model 
Case C: Case D: I 
3 IRS Q sensors 3 dedicated Q sensors 
computers computers 
I 
2 hardware actuators 
1 mathematical model 
I 2 hardware actuators 
1 1 mathematical model 
8.34 x low7 
J- 
2.44 x 1O-7 
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APPENDIX B: RELIABILITY DATA 
Reliability of the individual ACT functions and of combinations of those functions depends 
upon the failure rate of the component and upon the system configuration. The preferred 
source for reliability data was experience with the components in commercial service. If 
that information was not available, the manufacturer’s quoted failure rate or an analysis 
by subcomponents from MIL-HDBK-217 was used. Values used and their sources are listed 
in Tables B-l and B-2. 
Electric Power System Reliability-The electric power system has been designed 
especially to provide an extremely low probability of loss of all four active control 
electric channels or of individual channels. Each channel is supported from both an 
airplane dc bus and a battery. No two channels have the same two sources. The airplane 
dc buses support each other and are themselves powered from ac buses that have multiple 
sources of supply. A fault tree illustrating the failure paths necessary to produce channel 
Table B- 1. Failure Rates of ACT Components 
Power piston and servovalve 
T-valve 
LVDT servovalve 
LVDT power piston 
Solenoid bypass valve 
Total secondary actuator 
SingleWire segment 
NASA CR-145271 
Sum of above 
Connectors 
IO-pin stanchion connector 
(for essential PAS) 
20-pin stanchion 
IO-pin production break 
(uninhabited environment) 
20-pin production break 
(uninhabited environment) 
200pin rack-and-panel 
computer connector 
MIL-HDBK-217B 
MIL-HDBK-217B 
MIL-HDBK-2178 
MI L-HDBK-217B 
MIL-HDBK-2178 
Secondary actuator mechanical voter Multiple mechanical failures 
required to cause malfunctions 
Hydraulic power 
A 
Pneumatic power (for AAL) 
14.0 
54.6 
Boeing data 
(Two, each supplied from 
separate gas cylinders) 
Boeing data 
Electric power per channel - 0.001 Boeing estimate 
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Table B- 1. Failure Rates of ACT Components (Concluded) 
System elements 
Mean time between Failure rate per 
failures, FH lo6 FH Data source 
Actuator, secondary, outboard aileron 27 900 35.9” Boeing data 
Actuator, secondary, elevator 25 900 38.6* Boeing data 
Actuator, secondary, rudder 26 700 37.4* Boeing data 
Actuator, stick pusher 20 000 50.0* Boeing data on similar 727 
thrust reverser actuator 
Actuator, stick shaker 
Computer, primary 
(see table C-2 for breakdown) 
Computer, management 
Digital air data computer (DADC) 
(see table C-2 for breakdown) 
Sensor, inertial reference system 
Sensor, angle of attack 
(used with DADC, see table C-2) 
Sensor, flap position (LVDT) 
Sensor, wheel position (LVDT) 
Valve, solenoid, stick pusher 
IO6 1 .o 
6 620 151.0” 
6 620 151.0’ 
11 765 85.0* 
2 392 418.0” 
15 400 65.0 
91 000 11.0* 
91 000 11-o* 
65 400 15.3* 
727 experience 
Vendor data 
Vendor data 
Vendor MTBF 
Vendor MTBF 
727 experience 
NASA CR-145271 
NASA CR-145271 
Boeing data 
*Including connections and wires. 
failure is shown in Figures B-l and B-2. Input events shown in double circles are sets of 
components combined to simplify the drawing. Figure B-2 shows components of these 
sets, and Table B-3 lists failure rates used for the components. Analysis of the fault tree 
by the FTREE program yielded the failure rates in Table B-4 for several different takeoff 
conditions. It should be understood that when failure rates such as lo-14 or lo-16 appear, 
they represent only less than lo- 10. The numbers shown are presented for comparison but 
should not be interpreted as absolute values. 
The electric power system enters into the ACT system in many places and in very 
involved ways. To consider this dependency when calculating the ACT function failure 
probabilities would have been extremely costly in t,ime and computer use. Because failure 
rates are small, the electric power system does not contribute significantly to the ACT 
failure rate. Accordingly, electric power failure rates were not entered into the fault 
trees. 
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Table B-2. Partitioning of Failure Rates 
Line replaceable unit and its component functions 
ACT computer 151.0 6622 
CPU and memory 31.8 31450 
Crucial input/output 14.1 87640 
Noncrucial input/output 65.4 15 290 
Common parts 39.6 25 252 
DADC (note 1) 
Sensor, 01 (including vane) 
Sensor, q (including pitot) 
DADC common parts 
Sensor, air data, remaining parts 
85.0 11 765 
36.0 26316 
24.3 46152 
18.1 55250 
42.5 23530 
IRS (note 2) 
Sensor, Q (pitch rate) 
Sensor, normal acceleration 
Inertial reference, common parts 
Remaining parts (includes other rate channels, accelerometers, computation) 
418.0 2392 
20.4 49020 
31.7 31 550 
31.0 32260 
129.0 7752 
Notes: 
1. Components of DADC do not include external sensor parts, such as (Y 
vane and pitot tube, in addition to DADC parts. 
2. The entire IRS includes many parts never used by ACT. 
Failures 
per 
IO6 FH 
Mean time 
between 
failures, FH 
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T-R bus 2 
Imain dc bus 2 1 
rupportedl 
Figure B-l. Fault Tree for Electric System 
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dc 1 set P 
Figure B- 1. Fault Tree for Electric System (Concluded) 
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ac bus 1 set 
ac bus 2 set (opposite)-same 
rate 
I I T 
APU Set 
@ (iii& 
-Failure rates+130 
,,.,~~f,,,,, x 106/hr 
3.2 232 527 50 
Source: Boeing MIL-HDBK- Boeing Boeing Boeing 
experience 217C experience experience experience 
Equivalent 
-5 
Failure 
rates I- 
x lfT6/hr 
286 11.1 
Source: Estimate Boeing experience 
I\ 
473 to start 
APU to start and run: 3532 x 1 06/hr 
APU to continue to run: 3058 x 1 Om6/hr 
3059 to run 
Figure B-2. Sets of Components Redkcible to One Component 
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dc bus 1 set 
dc bus 2 set (opposite) 
Failure rates -2 
x 106/hr MI L-HDBK- 
Source:- 217~ 
Hot battery bus 1 
Hot battery bus 2 (opposite) 
I 
11.1 
Boeing 
0.1 
767 
calcu- 
lations 
288 ---, 
Cquivalent Failure rates 
x 106/hr 
Source: _ MI L-HDBh- 
*Charge can be observed by crew. Probability 
286 0 
of no charge for several flights small I 1 
compared to battery fails probability. I 
1 Not charging Not detected 
Charge set 1 
Charge set 2 (opposite) 
FL 
Crew 
fails 
to 
notice 
Failure rates - 90 
x 10~‘/hr Boeing 
Source:- experience 
1 
Estimated, 
confirmed 
from 
FTREE 
Estimated 
-5 
Estimated 
-5 
Figure B-2. Sets of Components Reducible to One Component (Concluded) 
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Table B-3. Electric Power System Component Failure Rates 
Failure 
probability 
(x lo-8/hr) 
942.0 
942.0 
3532.0 
3059.0 
40.0 
3.2 
3.2 
93.0 
! 3.2 
13.2 
3.2 
288.0 
288.0 
3.2 
3.2 
3.2 
0.2 
1.0 
1 .o 
1.0 
1.0 
1 .o 
1.0 
1 .o 
1.0 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
1 .o 
1.0 
1 .o 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1 .o 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
Source of failure rate Name of event 
See Figure B-2, ac bus set 
See Figure B-2, ac bus set 
See Figure B-2, APU set 
See Figure B-2, APU set 
Boeing experience and Rome Air 
ac bus 1 set 
ac bus 2 set 
Auxiliary power unit-fails to start and run 
Auxiliary power unit-fails to continue to run 
Over 90-kVA load, switch to one generator, excess 
Development Center (RADC) 
Boeing experience and RADC 
Boeing experience and RADC 
Boeing calculation 
See dc bus set 
See dc bus set 
Boeing experience and RADC 
See Figure B-2, hot battery 2 set 
See Figure B-2, hot battery 2 set 
Boeing experience and RADC 
Boeing experience and RADC 
Boeing experience and RADC 
Boeing experience and RADC 
M I L-21 7-all modes 
MIL-217-all modes 
MI L-217-all modes 
MIL-217-all modes 
MI L-21 7-all modes 
MIL-217-all modes 
MIL-217-all modes 
Ml L-217-all modes 
Boeing estimate 
Boeing estimate 
Boeing estimate 
Boeing estimate 
MI L-21 7C-all modes 
MI L-21 7C-all modes 
MIL-217C-all modes 
MIL-217C-all modes 
MI L-21 7C-all modes 
MI L-21 7C-all modes 
MIL-217C-all modes 
MI L-21 7C-all modes 
Arbitrary value to examine sensitivity 
Arbitrary value to examine sensitivity 
not shed 
Left bus tie breaker-fails open 
Right bus tie breaker-fails open 
Bus power control unit-all failure modes 
dc bus 1 set 
dc bus 2 set 
dc tie breaker-fails open 
Hot battery bus 1 set 
Hot battery bus 2 set 
Battery power breaker 1 contact 3-fails open 
Battery power breaker 1 contact 2-fails open 
Battery power breaker 2 contact 3-fails open 
Battery power breaker 2 contact 3-fails open 
Computer power input diode 1 -fails open 
Computer power input diode 2-fails open 
Computer power input diode 3-fails open 
Computer power input diode 4-fails open 
Computer power input diode 5-fails open 
Computer power input diode 6-fails open 
Computer power input diode 7-fails open 
Computer power input diode 8-fails open 
ACT T-R bus l-short circuit to ground 
ACT T-R bus 2-short circuit to ground 
Battery bus l-short circuit to ground 
Battery bus 2-short circuit to ground 
Computer power input diode 1 -short circuit across junction 
Computer power input diode 2-short circuit across junction 
Computer power input diode 3-short circuit across junction 
Computer power input diode 4-short circuit across junction 
Computer power input diode 5-short circuit across junction 
Computer .power input diode B-short circuit across junction 
Computer power input diode 7-short circuit across junction 
Computer power input diode 8-short circuit across junction 
(Probability the charger failed in previous flights and was 
not noticed by crew) 
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Table B-4. Electric System Failure Probabilities (I-hr Flight) 
Takeoff 
condition 
Two engine-driven 
systems on line 
and APU operable 
but not running 
Two engine-driven 
systems on line 
and APU inoperable 
No. 2 engine-driven 
system and APU on 
line; other engine- 
driven system 
inoperable 
Probability of all ac 
channels inoperative 
(i. e., probability of 
being dependent 
upon battery alone) 
3.3 x 10-g 
- 
Probability of 
one channel 
inoperative 
2.97 x 10-10 
4.63 x 10-l’ 
8.35 x 10-l’ 
Probability of three 
of four ACT channels 
inoperative (system 
failure) 
2.91 x 10-16 
4.95 x 10-14 
1.6 x lo-l3 
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APPENDIX C: ACT FUNCTION FAULT TREES 
The fault trees used to model the ACT functions are described here. Figure C-l is the 
essential PAS fault tree. The OR gate at the top of the tree feeds the event “essential 
PAS fault.” If any of the three inputs to this gate is positive (indicating a fault), the 
output indicates a fault; namely, that essential PAS is inoperative. The event “actuating 
fault” is the output of an AND gate fed by three OR gates, which implies that all three 
OR gates must give a failed condition for an actuating fault to occur. In this case the 
two-channel minimum requirement is satisfied by comparing actuator output with a 
mathematical model resident in all computers. Each of the three actuation OR gates is 
fed by one of the three crucial ACT secondary actuators, and its associated hydraulic 
system, and by the appropriate computer parts that control the actuator. Any of the 
events feeding an OR gate will, on failure, cause the loss of a single actuator. 
The “sensor fault” event is the output of an OR gate fed by a “pitch-rate sensing” fault or 
a “servo position sensing fault.” There are four linear variable differential transformers 
(LvDT) sensing servo position, even though there are only three actuators, because an 
extra LVDT senses the position of the summing linkage. The failure of three out of four 
of the LVDTs or their associated electronics results in a sensor fault because degradation 
below two operating channels is not allowed. 
The “pitch-rate sensing fault” is fed by the body axis pitch-rate (Q) analog parts from 
each of the three IRSs, including the associated ACT computer electronics, and also by 
the analog signal from a single dedicated Q sensor. Three of four failures are required for 
Q sensor failure because at least two channels are again required for success. 
The “computing fault” event is fed by failures in any one of the four ACT computer 
central processing unit (CPU) memories or common parts that control, monitor, and 
provide actuator modeling. Three of four failures are required to fail the system. It will 
be observed that “ACT computer common part” failure is a multiple occurring event that 
feeds every lower level gate of the “essential PAS” fault tree. This illustrates the 
usefulness of FTREE in handling dependencies and multiple occurring events. 
The full PAS fault tree, shown in Figure C-2, combines the functions of essential (or short 
period) PAS and static or speed stability augmentation PAS and is similar in structure. 
The sensors depend upon the computers to accept their signals. Partitioning of computer 
failure rates permits including only those parts of the computer that are required to be 
operable to receive the sensor inputs. Under dynamic pressure (q) sensing fault, the 
DADCs have also been partitioned into the q parts and those common parts (power 
supplies, cooling, structure) that are required to provide a q output. A failure is not 
charged for other failed parts. The additional function, gain scheduling, is backed up by 
an alternative, the flap position switch, so that both must have produced a fault input to 
the gain scheduling fault AND gate to get a fault output. These backup functions appear 
in several of the ACT functions and result in the backed-up function being virtually 
infallible. Certain parts of the ACT computers are of overriding importance because all 
sensors and actuators depend on the ACT computers for communication to the rest of the 
system. In this tree the ACT computers, subfunctions of the DADC, and the IRS are all 
multiple occurring events. 
The AAL (stick pusher and stick shaker) fault trees, shown in Figures C-3 and C-4, follow 
the same pattern. Stick pusher actuation is complicated by the need to ensure against 
inadvertent actuation. Each actuator is precluded from operating unless two solenoid 
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valves open, so both valves and one power source are combined in an OR gate; thus failure 
of any one could produce actuator failure, but both actuators would have to fail to 
produce AAL actuation failure. 
The probability of being required to divert during a I-hr flight is the probability of being 
one failure away from the loss of essential PAS or one failure away from loss of all of the 
set (full PAS and LAS and WLA). 
Essential PAS fault 
Sensor Fault 
Pitch rate 
sensing fault 
Figure C- 1. Essential Pitch-Augmented Stability Fault Tree 
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Full PAS fault 
Figure C-2. Full Pitch-Augmented Stability Fault Tree 
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I 
Angle-of-attach fault 
-able I 
Actuation fault 77 
Figure C-3. Angle-of-A ttack Limiter Inoperable Fault Tree 
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I AAL inadvertent actuation I 
catastrophic fault 
Three computers simultaneously or sequentially 
.put out a similar false and catastrophic signal 
on their own volition, but don’t detect the fault 
or shut down (negligible probability) 
One valve opens without appropriate signal 
current, and associated other servoamplifier 
emits false OPEN signal lcan occur four ways) 
Two servoamplifiers both give an open signal to 
a valve without proper sensor input (negligible 
probability) 
Two valves on the same actuator open without 
prerenoe of solenoid current 
Multiple catastro- 
phic pitch rates 
a m 0 
x x B 
d d 2 
Considers the probability that a maiority of one kind of sensor sequentially emits similar false 
signals that are such as to call for stick pushing, and that during this sequence the computer 
does not reject the individual errors as they occur. The chance of simultaneous occurrence of 
the same kinds of faults and of their being catastrophic is considered to b? negligible. 
Figure C-4. Angle-of-Attack Limiter Inadvertent Operation Fault Tree 
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This is predicted by combining the relevant fault trees into one tree and changing the 
number of components required to produce a failed condition at the appropriate gates. 
The FTREE computer program will then take account of all dependencies and multiple 
occurring events. 
Figure C-4 predicts the probability of inadvertent stick pusher actuation. In this case, 
failure in the sensors is not passive but produces a false signal that calls for actuation 
when it is not required. Failure in the actuation consists of actuation in the absence of a 
computer input signal calling for actuation. The computer fault consists of a computer 
output, in the absence of the appropriate sensor inputs, that the program and the rest of 
the computers fail to detect and deactivate. Commercial aircraft experience provided 
almost no data from which to calculate rates for such failure modes; therefore, 
conservative estimates were made. This fault tree, having an entirely different set of 
failure mode input events, cannot be combined with the rest of the ACT function fault 
trees to find the probability of joint failures. 
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